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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The emergence of human rights regional courts has led to challenges in defining the
scope and normative content of universal human rights. After all, regional human rights
treaties are accompanied by the possibility of geographical peculiarities in the
enforcement of human rights obligations. International courts have the difficult task of
reconciling—or justifying lack of reconciliation between—moral and normative
differences within each region.
One of the most important doctrinal creations in this regard is the margin of
appreciation (“MOA”), adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (“European
Court”). The MOA doctrine is an interpretative criterion developed both to grant
deference to States Parties so that they can regulate the content of rights and their
restrictions, and to distribute power and levels of decision-making between domestic
authorities and international courts. Although the concept “margin of appreciation” is not
found anywhere in the text of the European Convention on Human Rights1 (“European
Convention”) or its preparatory works,2 the MOA doctrine is now a fixed part of the
European Court case law in the interpretation of rights and their limitations.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “Inter-American Court”),
created under the American Convention on Human Rights3 (hereinafter “American
Convention”), is another regional court. This Court has not yet developed a theory of
deference to domestic authorities, which is mainly due to the number and type of cases
*

Research Fellow, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago (Chile). B.L. and MA, Universidad Alberto
Hurtado (Chile), LL.M. and S.J.D. candidate, Northwestern University (Chicago, Il.). Every decision of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights is cited from the official English translations, unless otherwise
noted. All other Spanish to English translations in this article, like citations to books or papers, are the
author’s, unless otherwise indicated. I would like to thank Bridget Arimond, Jorge Contesse, Sergio
Verdugo, José Manuel Díaz de Valdés, Raúl Letelier, and Katherine Klein for their comments on an earlier
version of this article. All errors are mine.
1 [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European
Convention”), open for signature Nov. 04, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
2 YUTAKA ARAI-T AKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 1-3 (2002).
3 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights (“American Convention”),
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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decided. While the European Court began its work in the 1960s and has decided more
than 15,000 contentious cases,4 the Inter-American Court only began work in the 1980s
and has decided a mere 160 contentious cases on the merits.5 Perhaps more importantly
than differing start dates, the political environment in which the courts began operating
was much different for the two entities. The European Court began deciding cases that
arose in a small number of democracies during the 1960s. Contrarily, when the InterAmerican Court started, the political and social environment of the Americas was the
complete opposite.6 Military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes were in power or had
recently ceased. Most contentious cases addressed issues concerning State liability for
acts of torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.7 The type of cases in
front of the courts has just started to change but the original different contexts determined
the path of each court’s jurisprudence.
This paper analyzes and compares the degree of international deference granted to
domestic authorities by the two courts. Commentators have analyzed the MOA doctrine
developed by the European Court, but national discretion at the Inter-American Court has
been less studied, especially as a comparative exercise. Deference can be studied only by
referring to the MOA doctrine. However, a more thoughtful approach should consider
other levels of national discretion. This paper fills the gaps in the literature8 by, first
providing an overview of the European MOA jurisprudence; second, by providing an
account of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence on matters of national discretion and
international deference; and third, by analyzing and comparing the jurisprudence of the
European and the Inter-American courts on the restriction of human rights and the leeway
granted to domestic authorities.
The paper is organized as follows. It is divided in two sections addressing the
European and the Inter-American human rights systems. In each section, the paper
examines different standards for discretion when it comes to the restriction of human
rights. Distinguishing three different levels of analysis in each section develops a
common ground for comparative reasons. The first level examines the legality of
restrictions or how limitations must be “prescribed by law.”9 The second level focuses on
the legitimate aim claimed by States in order to restrict a right.10 The third level reviews
For the European Court statistics, see the official documentation found in the website of the Court:
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, OVERVIEW 1959-2011 (2012),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_2011_ENG.pdf.
5 In the case of the Inter-American Court, every decision can be found online at Jurisprudence Finder,
CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/jurisprudencia.
6 SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 259 (1997).
7 See infra III, 1.
8 Two very recent exceptions can be found in current legal scholarship. The first one is a collective work
that provides a first approach to the MOA doctrine in the Americas, although not in a comparative fashion
as is intended in this paper. See generally PAOLA ANDREA ALVARADO ACOSTA & MANUEL NÚÑEZ
POBLETE, EL MARGEN DE APRECIACIÓN EN EL SISTEMA AMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS:
PROYECCIONES REGIONALES Y NACIONALES (2012). The second exception is a general book on the MOA
doctrine, which incorporates some comparisons between the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, the Inter-American Court, and the Human Rights Committee. It does not take into account,
however, how discretion operates in positive duties and the scholar debate of the MOA doctrine in the
Americas. See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012).
9 In the European context, see infra II.3.1. In the Inter-American system, see infra III.4.1.
10 In the European context, see infra II.3.2. In the Inter-American system, see infra III.4.2.
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one of the most important requirements concerning national discretion: restrictions must
be “necessary in a democratic society.”11 Necessity and proportionality of domestic
restrictive measures are examined under this third level. Also, in this level, cases are
classified to provide a better account on the international standards for deference. Groups
are summarized below.
However, there are some significant differences between the two systems. A
comparative analysis, then, should take into account these differences. That is why each
section has some special subsections. The European system is reviewed first. In this
section, the paper examines the MOA concept, its origins, and dimensions.12 Since the
European Court has been a pioneer in the creation of deferential standards, the European
section begins with the analysis of the MOA doctrine. The Inter-American section, on the
other hand, is initiated with a contextual account of the origins of the Inter-American
Court. A widespread situation of systematic human rights violations is necessary to
understand the exceptional invocation of the MOA doctrine in the Americas.13 That is
why it is also important to review the scholars’ debate regarding the convenience of the
MOA doctrine.14 Finally, one major difference should be noted. Cases decided are
different and sometimes there are no clear parallels between the two Court’s
jurisprudence.
A. Overview of Europe’s MOA Doctrine

¶7

¶8

In the European context, the Court has developed an MOA doctrine that allows
domestic discretion in the restriction of human rights. This paper classifies the leading
cases into three groups (hereinafter “EC Groups”). The first set of cases, EC Group 1, is
made up of cases concerning “core” or “fundamental” rights, such as the prohibition of
torture, and political rights, such as freedom of expression or freedom of association.15
Concerning fundamental rights, the European Court has exercised a stringent
international supervision and denied any room for domestic discretion. In political speech
cases or the rights of political parties, the Court has declared that only a “reduced” MOA
is afforded to domestic authorities. EC Group 2 is exemplified by property rights
decisions.16 In property rights cases, the Court recognizes greater latitude and defers more
readily to national authorities’ decisions.
There is no unifying criterion to EC Group 3. They are consolidated only to
demonstrate the doctrine’s complexities, highlighting the various results that are possible
through the application of an MOA analysis. Dissimilar rights such as freedom of
religion, free (non-political) speech, and the right to privacy all fall within this group.17
Regarding defamation laws or the regulation of the display of religious symbols, the
European Court has granted deference to domestic authorities, generally upholding
domestic decisions. In contrast, the Court has exercised more intensive review in cases

In the European context, see infra II.3.3. In the Inter-American system, see infra III.4.3.
See infra II, 1-2.
13 See infra III, 1-2.
14 See infra III, 3.
15 See infra II, 3.3.1.
16 See infra II, 3.3.2.
17 See infra II, 3.3.3.
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concerning privacy rights of homosexuals, and its case law has evolved towards the
protection of transsexuals’ rights to the detriment of any MOA.
B. Overview of the Americas’ Situation
¶9

The Inter-American system is different. First, the Inter-American Court has not
developed or adopted a comprehensive theory of deference or an MOA doctrine. The
Inter-American Court has cited the MOA doctrine literally only in two cases.18 Despite
the lack of such a formalized doctrine like the MOA, this paper still breaks the cases
down, like the three groups applied to the European MOA case law, in order to analyze
the existence or lack thereof of a systematic application of deference to the InterAmerican jurisprudence. As above, this paper classifies the Court’s decisions into three
groups (hereinafter “IC Groups”) in order to understand the degree of deference allowed
under the American Convention. IC Group 1 comprises the majority of the Court’s
decisions, which involve gross and systematic cases of forced disappearances,
extrajudicial killings, and acts of torture.19 The Inter-American Court does not grant any
deference in these situations.
¶10
Moreover, the Court has developed a doctrine of positive duties, obligating States
to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for these acts. The imposition of
positive obligations has a dual effect on national discretion. The interpretation of the
Inter-American Court adds a “new” obligation to States Parties, not only to refrain from
violating the Convention’s rights but also to protect and to promote them. At the same
time, the positive obligations open up a new sphere for national discretion. The Court
has refined these obligations but domestic authorities retain some latitude in
implementing them.
¶11
A second set of cases, IC Group 2, includes the rights of vulnerable groups, such as
women or indigenous peoples.20 The Court has declared that the principle of equality and
the prohibition of non-discrimination is a jus cogens rule of international human rights
law.21 In some circumstances, the importance of the principle of equality has led the
Court to promote affirmative action for the purposes of protecting these groups.
Affirmative action is another type of positive duty, and the interpretation of the Court
imposes new obligations though some margin of national discretion remains. IC Group 3
deals with free speech issues.22 Here, the Court has upheld the prohibition of prior
restraint and scrutinized carefully criminal offenses restricting free speech. That is, the
Court has refused to grant discretion in political speech cases or in cases involving any
type of censorship.
¶12
The paper concludes by addressing new challenges that the Inter-American Court is
confronting, concerning national discretion issues. One case reviewed there shows how
the Inter-American Court is able to leave certain leeway to States without relying on the
MOA doctrine and merely applying a proportionality examination. Proportionality, then,

See infra III, 2.
See infra III, 4.3.1.
20 See infra III, 4.3.2.
21 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 2003).
22 See infra III, 4.3.3.
18

19
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appears to be the main legal device by which the Court could identify potential national
discretion spheres under the American Convention.
II. NATIONAL DISCRETION AND INTERNATIONAL DEFERENCE UNDER THE EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

A. Margin of Appreciation as a Doctrine of Deference to Domestic Authorities
¶13

The expression “margin of appreciation” is a term of art borrowed by the European
Court from domestic legal systems. According to Macdonald, the origins of the
expression are claimed to be the French term margé d’appreciation, used by the French
Conseil d’Etat.23 Another commentator has contested this finding and has said that the
term also comes from “the system of administrative law within every civil law
jurisdiction” and most notably, from the German theory of administrative discretion
(Ermessensspierlraum), although such theory is much narrower than the MOA doctrine.24
¶14
The MOA has been defined as “the notion that each society is entitled to certain
latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts between individual rights and national interests
or among different moral convictions.”25 It is a jurisprudential creation adopted by the
European Court26 that allows the Court to defer to domestic organs in the protection of
rights and their limits but at the same time, maintaining those rights subject to
international supervision.27 It has been argued that the MOA is one of the legal vehicles
that balance the universal aspect of human rights with the local and domestic peculiarities
of each state.28
¶15
The MOA doctrine has been intimately linked to the resolution of human rights
disputes involving highly contentious moral issues. Cases relating to the display of
religious symbols in public schools29 or the use of the Islamic veil in public places30 have
been among the most important issues where the MOA has been employed by the
European Court to defer to domestic decisions. The European Court has acknowledged
that it ought to defer to domestic authorities, especially when there is no regional
consensus among the European Convention parties. A recent example of the Court’s
cautious deferential approach is found in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,31 where the
European Court held that the States were not obliged to legislate or legally recognize gay
marriage under the European Convention.

Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION
St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
24 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 2-3.
25 Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. &
POL’Y 843, 843-44 (1999).
26 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 47-48 (1976).
27 Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?, 23 HUM. RTS. L.
J. 161 (2002).
28 Benvenisti, supra note 25, at 844. Another legal principle that seeks to balance the international with the
domestic level is the principle of subsidiarity. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle
of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 39 (2003).
29 See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
30 See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
31 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
23
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¶16

This section characterizes and organizes the European Court case law into groups
in order to understand the different degrees of discretion and deference afforded to
European States in the regulation of rights and their restrictions. The MOA doctrine is
complex not only because of the multiplicity and variety of decisions in which it has been
applied, but also because the standards used by the Court under the MOA has and
continues to evolve with time. States practices that were once considered valid under the
MOA doctrine have subsequently been found in breach of the European Convention.32
For the purposes of categorizing the case law of the Court, this paper adopts and
combines two scholars’ contributions to this field. The paper acknowledges the
distinction adopted by Letsas, who has affirmed that the MOA doctrine encompasses two
different dimensions: a substantive dimension, dealing with the limitations of rights, and
another dimension (which is structural) that addresses the subsidiarity of international
courts in relation to national States.33 After reviewing the origins of the MOA doctrine,
this paper describes the distinction first developed by Letsas. The paper also adopts a
theory on the varying degrees of discretion that the European Court has granted to
national authorities, depending on the type of right at stake. Here, the contribution of
García Roca is followed. García Roca developed a concentric-circles theory showing the
different levels of discretion afforded to national authorities.34 The theory only applies to
the substantive dimension defined by Letsas. By combining these two scholars’
contributions, this section seeks to provide a brief but comprehensive account of the
deference and discretion that European Convention States Parties enjoy under the MOA
doctrine.
¶17
The proceeding parts of the paper are organized as follows. Part II.2 describes the
origins of the MOA doctrine and how the jurisprudential evolution has led to its
consolidation as a decisive interpretative criterion used by the European Court of Human
Rights. From there, it describes the doctrinal requirements established by the European
Court in order to validly restrict rights. In this section, and under the analysis of the
proportionality review undertaken by the Court, the paper advances an application of the
concentric-circles theory as an illustration of the degrees of deference afforded to the
domestic authorities when it comes to the restriction of rights. The analysis, in this
section, introduces new decisions that García Roca did not cite supporting the proposed
theoretical framework. The section concludes by summarizing its most important
findings on the origins, application and evolution of the MOA doctrine as a decisive
interpretative criteria developed by the European Court of Human Rights.
B. The MOA doctrine: origins and dimensions
¶18

The origins of the MOA doctrine show its jurisprudential application, on the one
hand, in emergency situations and derogations of rights and, on the other, in the
See infra II, 3.3.3.3.
The distinction was first made in George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26
OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 705 (2006), and later refined in GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF
INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2009).
34 Javier García Roca, La Muy Discrecional Doctrina del Margen de Apreciación Nacional según el
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos: Soberanía e Integración, 20 TEORÍA Y REALIDAD
CONSTITUCIONAL 117 (2007). On a different understanding on how to classify the degrees of discretion
concerning the MOA doctrine, see Legg, supra note 8, at 66-174.
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restriction of the rights under ordinary circumstances. It was first introduced by the
European Commission of Human Rights (“European Commission”) in the context of
emergency measures and derogations of human rights under article 15 of the European
Convention.35 The European Court, on the other hand, initially adopted the MOA
doctrine in the landmark decision Handyside v. United Kingdom.36 Two years later, the
Court relied on the doctrine in a case dealing with derogations of rights. It has been said
that the MOA doctrine has “dual origins,” both in the state of emergency context under
the regime of article 15 of the Convention, and the normal or ordinary restriction of
human rights, as authorized in by the Convention.37 From emergencies to normal
circumstances and then again to emergencies, the concept of the MOA completed a
doctrinal circle that sealed its place in the jurisprudence of the European Court.
¶19
In cases dealing with emergencies and derogations of rights, the first traces of the
doctrine can be found in the early reports of the European Commission. Under article 15,
States enjoy a wide MOA in determining whether there is an emergency and what rights
and to what extent should those rights be derogated from the Convention. This type of
MOA, therefore, is strictly connected to the different elements in article 15. In the Cyprus
Case, the Commission held that States “should be able to exercise a certain measure of
discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”38
The same European Commission would later rename domestic discretion as a “margin of
appreciation” in the Lawless v. Ireland decision.39 The Commission held that states
should be allowed “a certain discretion—a certain margin of appreciation . . . in
determining whether there exists a public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and which must be dealt with by exceptional measures derogating from its normal
obligations under the Convention.”40 However, the European Court did not rely on the
MOA doctrine on emergency and derogations issues until it decided Ireland v. United
Kingdom,41 a case addressing the discretion on the use of the state’s power to derogate
from the obligations established in the European Convention. The Court had to examine
whether the British government had applied drastic restricting measures of rights “to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” as prescribed by article 15. In
this case, and for the first time in the context of emergencies, the European Court held
that “[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the
moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope

35 European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 15.
“Article 15. Derogation in times of emergency.
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law. . . .”
36 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 47-48 (1976).
37 HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1996).
38 Greece v. United Kingdom (Cyprus Case), App. No. 176/56, 1958-9 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174, at
176 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.).
39 Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, Eur. Ct. H.R. 132 (1958).
40 Id. at ¶ 36.
41 Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
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of derogations necessary to avert it” and, consequently, domestic organs enjoy “a wide
margin of appreciation” in the application of article 15 of the European Convention.42
¶20
In cases dealing with the ordinary restrictions and limitations of human rights, the
European Court introduced the MOA doctrine to decide those cases in which States
invoked a legitimate aim to restrict a right under the Convention. The Convention
establishes rights using the following structure: first, it recognizes a right—e.g. paragraph
1 of articles 8-10—and secondly, the Convention allows the restriction of the right under
certain legitimate aims and confined to the necessity in a democratic society. Initially, the
interpretation of the restriction of rights was done in terms of affording a generic
discretion or deference to domestic authorities. Therefore, in the 1970s, the Court
considered that national authorities enjoyed discretion in defining measures to protect the
right to education and the principle of non-discrimination in educational matters,43 in
regulating freedom of assembly when it came to trade unions,44 and in restricting the
rights of soldiers and the application of disciplinary measures inside the military.45 The
“decisive breakthrough”46 came with the Court’s decision in the Handyside case.47 The
case concerned the seizure of copies of a book entitled The Little Red Schoolbook, a
publication intended for teenagers on a wide array of issues, including sex education. The
editor was convicted for the possession of obscene books for publication for gain.48
Having exhausted domestic judicial proceedings, Handyside filed a communication
claiming the violation of his right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the
Convention.49 The Court laid down, for the first time, a formulation of the MOA doctrine
applied to rights’ restrictions, specifically by interpreting section 2 of article 10. The
European Court considered that the “the machinery of protection established by the
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights.”50 Given this
Id. at ¶ 207 (emphasis added).
Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v.
Belgium, App. No. 1474/62, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 10 (1968) (holding that national authorities “remain free to
choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the
Convention. Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of
the Convention.”).
44 See, e.g., Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, App. No. 5614/72, at ¶ 40 (1976) (where the Court
interpreted that the European Convention “certainly leaves each State a free choice of the means to be
used” to protect the rights of each of the members of a given union).
45 Engel and others v. Netherlands, App. No. 5100/71, at ¶¶ 72, 100 (1976).
46 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 7.
47 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976).
48 Id., at ¶¶1 6-7.
49 European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10:
“Freedom of expression.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.”
50 Handyside, supra note 27, at ¶ 48.

42
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situation, the Court reasoned that “the task of securing the rights and liberties [that the
European Convention] enshrines” relies, in the first place, on each of the State party’s
national authorities.51 Accordingly, the internal organs of each state should judge if the
restrictive measure, based on the protection of “public morals”, was “necessary in a
democratic society,” as prescribed by article 10. The Court used the MOA notion to
examine the level of discretion that domestic authorities enjoy in these cases. In
particular, the European Court held that:
it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting
States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their
respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and
from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid
and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge
to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on
the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them. . . .
[I]t is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the
reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of “necessity” in
this context.52
¶21

The Court concluded that the British Parliament and judicial organs enjoy an MOA
in the assessment of any “pressing social need” that might justify the restriction of
freedom of expression. Deference, nevertheless, is neither absolute nor “unlimited”:
“[t]he domestic margin of appreciation . . . goes hand in hand with a European
supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its
‘necessity’; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even
one given by an independent court.”53 The European Court found that British courts
“were entitled, in the exercise of their discretion, to think at the relevant time that the
Schoolbook would have pernicious effects on the morals of many of the children and
adolescents who would read it.”54 The Court found no breach of article 10 of the ECHR.
¶22
The Handyside decision is considered the first time that the European Court
established the “prototype” of the MOA analysis55—although it never really defined the
doctrine with specificity—by connecting the elements of subsidiarity, necessity and
international supervision in the review of rights’ restrictions.56 The relevance of the
decision is best understood by its effect in the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence:
Handyside expanded the application of the MOA doctrine from extraordinary measures
of derogations—where it was argued originally by the European Commission—to the
ordinary restriction of rights in accordance with the clause “necessary in a democratic
society” found in paragraph 2 of articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR and in article 2.3 of

51

Id.
Id.
53 Id. at ¶ 49.
54 Id. at ¶ 52.
55 García Roca, supra note 35, at 122.
56 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 8.
52
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Protocol No. 4 to the same treaty.57 In addition, the MOA analysis in Handyside is clearly
designed to deal with hard cases involving moral issues, where different national
standards could be found among the European Convention States Parties.
¶23
Three components of the Court’s decision in Handyside are critical to this paper.
First, the decision tries to strike a balance between two competing interests: an individual
right secured by the Convention—freedom of expression—and a collective goal—the
protection of morals—authorized by the same international instrument as a potential
source for the restrictions of the right. The MOA doctrine allows national authorities to
evaluate how such equilibrium can best be achieved. The doctrine seeks to provide a
substantive interpretation on rights restrictions. Second, international supervision as
understood by the European Court in reviewing rights’ restrictions, encompasses the
application of the principle of proportionality, especially in assessing the necessity of the
domestic measure adopted inside the context of a democratic society. This level of
analysis of the MOA doctrine is also substantive, in terms of defining the scope and
extension of rights under the European Convention. Third, the European Court declined
to turn itself into a “fourth instance” court of appeal: it circumscribed its jurisdictional
role as one that was “subsidiary to that of member states” and “essentially one of review”
of alleged violations of rights at the regional level.58 This level of analysis in the MOA
doctrine is structural: it describes the relationship between a regional court of human
rights and domestic authorities under parameters of subsidiarity.59
¶24
Both the substantive and the structural layers of the MOA doctrine describe the
varying degrees of deference afforded by the European Court to domestic authorities.
This research analyzes only one of the two core elements of the MOA from the
distinction adopted by Letsas—the substantive component, dealing with the restriction of
rights. The structural dimension of the MOA doctrine, although it is useful to understand
the role of the European Court and its relation to domestic authorities, is left aside for
future comparative research.60
C. National Deference, the MOA Doctrine and the Restrictions of Rights
¶25

The MOA doctrine allows substantive deference to domestic authorities, which
may restrict the scope and extension of human rights established in the European
Convention. The Court has developed a doctrinal test to review the conduct of States
Parties in the restriction of those rights. Such requirements can be considered part of a
general theory of human rights under the European Convention.61 Three doctrinal
requirements must be met for a restriction of a right to be considered compatible with the
Convention: a) the restriction must have been “prescribed by law” (or established “in
Id.; Yourow, supra note 37, at 15.
STEVE GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: INTERPRETATION AND DISCRETION UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (2000).
59 Letsas, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
33, at 91-93.
60 Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 34.
61 Joaquín Brage Camazano, Aproximación a una Teoría General de los Derechos Fundamentales en el
Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 74 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 111,
128-35 (2005); Yutaka Arai, The System of Restrictions, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 333-50 (Peter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
57
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accordance with the law”);62 b) the domestic restricting measure must have pursued one
or more “legitimate aims” under the European Convention; c) and every interference with
the exercise of a right must be deemed “necessary in a democratic society.”63 The last
doctrinal requirement involves the application of the principle of proportionality in the
assessment and review of the restricting measures.
¶26
The European Court examines each conventional requirement in a sequential
fashion: (1) it first analyzes if the restriction was authorized or prescribed by law, (2) then
examines the presence of a legitimate aim, and (3) finally reviews the necessity of the
restrictive measure under the context of a democratic society. The review escalates from
(1) to (3). If the Court finds a breach of (1) or (2), then it does not go to examine (3).64
The Court, however, usually pays more attention to (3) the necessity requirement.65 The
small relevance of the second standard is explained by the fact that most States justify
their conduct under a legitimate aim and the Court connects the material analysis of the
justification with the proportionality review of the restrictive measure.66
¶27
It is relevant to note that the European Court affords varying degrees of domestic
discretion when it comes to compliance of each requirement. The difference is explained
partly in light of the definition of each requirement, but mostly it can be understood as
growing out of the divergent and factual-sensitive application of the proportionality
principle. For the purposes of clarity, each requirement is analyzed separately.
1. The restriction must have been “prescribed by/in accordance with” the law
¶28

The first step is to determine if the restriction has been authorized by, or executed
in accordance with, the law. This step is addressed by two sub-questions. The main issue
with respect to this requirement is the definition and meaning of law. A first question that
arises is whether the European Convention demands that every restriction must be
enshrined in a statutory provision, requiring legislation strictu sensu. If the answer is no,
then another question emerges: what conditions must a norm satisfy to lawfully restrict a
right under the European Convention? The first question deals with the potential sources
of law that can restrict rights in full conformity with the Convention. The second question
deals with the material or substantive conditions that the restricting law must satisfy to be
compatible with the Convention.67

The text of the European Convention employs different phrases to establish the same requirement. In
recognizing the right to freedom of expression, the Convention allows its restriction when it is “prescribed
by law.” European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10.2. The same term is used in article 9.2. Id. at art.
9.2. In recognizing the right to respect for private and family life, the Convention allows restrictions “in
accordance with law.” Id. at art. 8.2. The same term is used in article 2.3 of the Protocol No. 4 to the
European Convention. Id. at art. 2.3.
63 The paper does not address the issue of “implied” or “inherent” limitations of human rights under the
European Convention. On that subject, see Arai, supra note 61, at 342-48; Camazano, supra note 61, at
131.
64 Arai, supra note 61, at 335.
65 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 9.
66 Camazano, supra note 61, at 131-32.
67 Lorenzo Martín-Retortillo Báquer, La Calidad de la Ley según la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo
de Derechos Humanos (Especial Referencia a los Casos “Valenzuela Contreras” y “Prado Bugallo”
ambos contra España), 17 DERECHO PRIVADO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 377, 390-92 (2003).
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¶29

The European Court has determined that a right can be restricted by a norm that has
not necessarily been codified or legislatively enacted. “Law,” accordingly and for the
purposes of the system of rights’ limitation of the Convention, should not be strictly
identified with either a statute or an act of the legislature. Two major consequences
follow from this: first, the restriction of rights under the common law of some State—
most prominently, the United Kingdom—is, in principle, compatible with the European
Convention;68 secondly, restrictions of rights can come from a different source that is not
the normative expression of the legislative power, permitting regulations by Executive
decrees or administrative rules or ordinances.69
¶30
As a result of accepting a plurality of sources of law, the European Court had to
develop a substantive notion of the “quality” of law under the Convention.70 The
substantive criteria for determining whether a right’s limitation was “prescribed by law”
were addressed by an early Court decision. In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,71 the
Court interpreted for the first time the meaning of the phrase “prescribed by law” from
article 10 of the European Convention.72 The European Court had to decide whether the
common law offense of contempt of court could be considered as “law” for restricting the
right of freedom of expression. The Court held that two conditions follow from the
expression “prescribed by law” in article 10: first, the law must be “accessible” and
second, it must be “foreseeable.”73 The former condition prescribes that “the citizen must
be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules
applicable to a given case.”74 The latter requires that the restrictive rule “is formulated
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able—if
need be with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”75 Therefore, the
European Court rejected a narrow reading of the word “law” as being only a synonym for
a statute or a code.76 Although a statute did not establish the offense of contempt of court,
the European Court decided in Sunday Times that the claimants were in a position to
foresee—on a reasonable basis– the risks of disobedience of the court’s ruling and the
negative consequences that should follow.77
¶31
The two material conditions of accessibility and foreseeability have different tests.
“Accessibility” demands “that the law [be available] at the reasonable disposal of the

Id. at 10.
Greer, supra note 58, at 16.
70 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 10; Báquer, supra note 68.
71 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979).
72 In Sunday Times, the European Court compared the English and the French versions of the European
Convention to interpret the meaning of the word “law.” Id., at ¶ 48. The Court did not rely on any previous
decision and assess for the first time the requirements that “flow” from the expression “prescribed by law.”
73 Id. at ¶ 49.
74 Id. The European Court uses the expression “indication” that could be read as requiring that the law
should provide sufficient notice to citizens of their rights and the restrictions of those rights.
75 Id. (emphasis in the original).
76 See Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 29 (1990); Huvig v. France, App. No.
11105/85, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 28 (1990). “The Court has always understood the term ‘law’ in its
‘substantive’ sense, not its ‘formal’ one; it has included both enactments of lower rank than statutes . . . and
unwritten law.”
77 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 52 (1979).
68
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citizens with the advice of legal experts”78 and that it does not require legal codification
of every law.79 “Foreseeability,” on the other hand, connects with the specifics of the
legal mandate, permission or prohibition. It does not require complete and absolute
certainty of the legal obligations and restrictions of a given right, but demands enough
textual precision (both in statutes or precedents), so that individuals have a real
opportunity to adjust their conduct in accordance with the law.80
¶32
In determining the level of precision that a restricting rule of law must satisfy in
order to be compatible with the Convention, the Court has considered a variety of
elements to judge the foreseeability of a law, especially in assessing the national courts’
case law and domestic administrative rules. In Kokkinakis v. Greece, for example, the
Court held that “a body of settled case-law”—which is published and accessible to
citizens—might contribute in achieving the necessary foreseeability of a lawful
restriction of rights under the European Convention.81 The jurisprudence of the Court
accepts that “excessive rigidity” in restricting rights is not desirable and that the law
should be able to adapt to “changing circumstances.” Accordingly, a certain degree of
vagueness in the law is not, per se, a violation of the State’s obligations.82 Executive or
administrative directives also may help to define the reach of a right’s restriction. In
Silver et al. v. United Kingdom, the Court considered that prison regulations limiting the
privacy of correspondence satisfied the standard of “in accordance with the law”
established in article 8 of the Convention. The European Court held that although the
“directives did not themselves have the force of law, they may—to the admittedly limited
extent to which those concerned were made sufficiently aware of their contents—be
taken into account in assessing whether the criterion of foreseeability was satisfied in the
application of the [Prison Act and its] Rules.”83
¶33
The quality of law requirement that flows from the expressions “prescribed by/in
accordance with” the law, allows certain but not unlimited national discretion. A certain
level of discretion is granted to domestic authorities in choosing the source of law where
the restriction of rights is established. The European Convention allows plural and
different sources of law as valid norms in the restriction of rights.84 This range of
flexibility could be considered as a regional compromise to avoid interfering with the
different legal traditions of law coexisting in Europe, especially by recognizing the
common law tradition as a valid legal source for the restrictions of rights. The substantive
conditions, however, allow the domestic authorities to regulate rights by administrative
rules. The standard that the European Court has used in these cases could be considered
Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 10.
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 49 (1979).
80 Id. See also Silver et al. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75,
7113/75, 7136/75, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 88 (1983).
81 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 40 (1993).
82 Id.; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 49 (1979); Silver et al. v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75, Eur. Ct.
H.R., at ¶ 88 (1983).
83 Silver et al. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75,
7136/75, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 88 (1983).
84 Greer, supra note 58, at 16 (listing not only domestic legislation but also “judge-made law typical of
common law jurisdictions, international legal obligations applicable to the state in question, and a variety of
‘secondary’ sources, for example, royal decrees, emergency decrees, and certain internal regulations based
on law.” (footnotes omitted)).
78
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more deferential when they are contrasted with the Inter-American Court’s
interpretation.85
2. The restriction must pursue a “legitimate aim” under the European Convention
¶34

A right established in the European Convention can be restricted only if the
domestic measure pursues a “legitimate aim” established in the text of the Convention.86
Most of the interests protected in the limitation clauses are “public interest objectives”87
but others are “individual rights” interests, depending on the circumstances of each
case.88 Both, nonetheless, may constitute a permissible governmental purpose to restrict a
right under ordinary circumstances.
¶35
States parties are only authorized to interfere with a right if they justify their action
based on a “legitimate aim” under the European Convention. The Convention establishes
an exhaustive enumeration of permissible interests that can be claimed to restrict a
right.89 The European Court, nonetheless, has “very rarely found a violation of
Convention rights by reference to the second standard,” that is, after assessing whether
the restrictive measure was prescribed by law.90 One of the few cases where the Court has
found a violation of the Convention due to the absence of a legitimate aim is Darby v.
Sweden.91 The European Court held that there was no legitimate aim supporting the
discrimination of the exemption of a church tax for a registered foreign worker and not
for non-registered ones.92 In that case, even the government of Sweden “did not argue
that the distinction in treatment had a legitimate aim”93 which may have made the case
quite easy for the Court. Without a legitimate aim claimed by state officials, the Court did
not need to go to a necessity review of the restrictive measure.94
See infra III, 4.1.
Rights with limitation clauses have different legitimate aims. Some of them are repeated in the different
rights, for example, “national security” (European Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 6.1, 8.2, 10.2, 11.2),
“public safety” (Id. at arts. 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2), “prevention of disorder or crime” (Id. at arts. 8.2, 10.2,
11.2), “protection of health” (Id. at arts. 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2), “protection of morals” (Id. at arts. 6.1, 8.2,
9.2, 10.2, 11.2), and “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Id. at arts. 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2). Some
legitimate aims appear only in respect to certain rights: “protection of the private life of the parties” (Id. at
art. 6.1), “interests of justice” (Id. at art. 6.1), “interests of juveniles” (Id. at art. 6.1), “economic well being
of the country” (Id. at art. 8.2), “interests of territorial integrity” (Id. at art. 10.2), “protection of the
reputation or the rights of others” (Id. at art. 10.2), and “maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary” (Id. at art. 10.2).
87 The expression “public interest objective” is found in GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE
CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 72-75 (2009). It is worth noting that domestic courts and
scholarship sometimes use different expressions to express the same idea—like “collective goals”,
“collective interest,” “public interest” or “State interest” —but all of them have a common denominator as
a public interest competing against an individual right. Id. at 74.
88 Greer, supra note 58, at 25.
89 Webber, supra note 87, at 73.
90 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 11; Arai, supra note 61, at 339.
91 Darby v. Sweden, App. No. 11581/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).
92 Id. at ¶ 34.
93 Id. at ¶ 33.
94 The European Court sometimes conflates the “legitimate aim” and the “necessary in a democratic
society” analysis. In Thlimmenos v. Greece, the Court decided that the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness,
under insubordination charges and for refusing to wear a military uniform at a time of general mobilization
into the Greek armed forces, violated the prohibition of non-discrimination (article 14 of the European
85
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There are several arguable reasons on why this second standard is not a major
obstacle to restrict a right. First of all, legitimate aims are particularly vague and abstract,
allowing the government to seek the justification for domestic measures under the broad
meaning of the “protection of morals” or “public order”95, to name two classic examples
of vague clauses. Another explanation is found in the democratic nature of the European
Convention States Parties: “[n]o democratically accountable State wishes to be accused
of expressly or implicitly incorporating arbitrary purposes into its legislation.”96 Scholars
tend to agree that the Court does not exercise strict supervision on the merits of the
legitimate aim argued by the State party, tending to fuse this analysis with the third
standard: the necessity in a democratic society.97 If that is the case, the requirement of a
“legitimate aim” is either a mere formality, because its analysis on the merits is done in
conjunction with the proportionality principle, or it operates as a negative requirement,
granting great latitude to domestic authorities. The latter possibility seems more plausible
and can be reconciled with the structure of the European Convention, that requires, in a
different paragraph, a legitimate aim to be protected if a right is going to be restricted.98
In other words, the European Court is going to review whether the State party has
justified the restrictive measure under one of the legitimate aims prescribed in the
Convention. If there is no legitimate aim invoked—as in Darby—the restriction of the
right constitutes almost an automatic violation of the Convention. However, States will
usually argue that the restriction had a certain justification under one or more legitimate
aims enshrined in the Convention. But if the States claim a legitimate aim, then the Court
moves on reviewing the necessity of the restrictive measure. Such a methodological
approach can only imply that the Court grants almost complete deference to States in
choosing the legitimate aim under the European Convention. No substantive control is
exercised to judge if the aim itself was correctly invoked and the merits review of the aim
is deferred to the last analytical stage. In conclusion, States are required to claim a
legitimate aim established in the Convention, while having almost complete deference in
choosing one of them; after that, the analysis turns to the third standard, where the
necessity of the measure—in light of the aim pursued—is examined.
3. The restriction must be “necessary in a democratic society”

¶37

Most cases brought before the European Court satisfy the first and second prongs
of the doctrinal test on rights restrictions. That is not the case with the final part of that
review. The third standard requires that the European Court examine if each rights’
restriction is “necessary in a democratic society.” The restriction of a right has to be
Convention), in connection with freedom of religion (article 9 of the same treaty). The Court said that
imposing such sanction was “disproportionate” but it also added the following: the criminal punishment
“did not pursue a legitimate aim. As a result, the Court finds that there existed no objective and no
reasonable justification for not treating the applicant differently from other persons convicted of a felony.”
Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. No. 34369/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 47 (2000).
95 See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(2) E.
96 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 11.
97 Id.; Arai, supra note 61, at 340 (stating that “this standard is normally carried out in conjunction with the
third, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, and in particular, with the application of the principle of
proportionality.”); Webber, supra note 87, at 73 (affirming that “acknowledging a public interest as within
the realm of permissible public ends at the second stage is almost without consequence.”).
98 See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 8(2), 10(2).
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justified by a “pressing social need.” States parties enjoy an MOA in assessing the
national reality and the factual and normative circumstances that constitute the
aforementioned “need” for each society.99 Under the European Court’s doctrine,
nonetheless, the domestic MOA is not unlimited: it “goes hand in hand” with the
international supervision exercised by the Court to verify whether a government’s actions
have been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.100
¶38
Under the “necessary in a democratic society” standard, the European Court has
developed a proportionality review of rights restrictions. The principle of proportionality
has legal origins that are not limited to the European human rights system and have been
documented at considerable length elsewhere.101 Proportionality review constitutes a
general principle of judicial review in several constitutional systems102 and in public
international law at large.103 Under the European system of human rights, the MOA
doctrine and the proportionality principle are intimately connected: the latter has been
called “the other side” of the former.104 Both interpretative criteria developed by the
European Court are conceptually interrelated, so the degree of domestic appreciation will
affect the intensity of the proportionality review and vice versa: the wider the national
discretion granted, the less intense the proportionality examination; on the other hand, the
stricter the principle of proportionality applied, the more reduced the amount of deference
afforded to States authorities.105 It is also worth noticing that both the MOA and the
proportionality standards require considering the factual circumstances of each case,
which has given rise to a strong scholarly critique of the case-by-case approach adopted
in the European Court’s jurisprudence.106 This has led some to argue that it is quite
difficult to group and classify cases where either the MOA doctrine or the proportionality
principle has been applied. Critics charge that no general doctrine or theory can be
construed around these concepts, mainly because the MOA, as a standard, is always
factually sensitive, it has an evolving parameter, and it depends on the changing regional
consensus.107 These factors have undermined the coherence and consistency of the MOA
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 48-49 (1976).
Id.
101 See JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR B ALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND PRIMARITY IN THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF ON HUMAN RIGHTS 33-40 (2009).
102 In Germany, see ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL R IGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2002);
in Spain, see CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES (3rd ed. 2007); in the United States, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987). In general, see DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF
LAW (2004); Webber, supra note 87, at 87.
103 Christoffersen, supra note 101, at 35.
104 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 14.
105 Id.; García Roca, supra note 34, at 124; MARK JANIS, RICHARD KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY, EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 156 (2nd ed., 2000); Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, supra note
33, at 707.
106 Christoffersen, supra note 101, at 31; Greer, supra note 58, at 20 (stating that while proportionality
should, in principle, limit “the scope for national discretion, the particular facts of any given case, and the
circumstances prevailing in the given country at the time, may broaden it in practice.”); Macdonald, supra
note 23, at 83-124; Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 380 (1997).
107 JUKKA VILJAEN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A DEVELOPER OF THE GENERAL
DOCTRINES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW —A STUDY OF THE LIMITATION CLAUSES OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 271, 339-40 (2003). Others have pointed out that the MOA doctrine
99
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doctrine. Although proportionality and MOA are clearly interrelated, this paper will focus
on the latter rather than the former.
¶39
Amongst seeming precedential chaos, in order to classify the vast jurisprudence of
the European Court, cases can be distinguished based on the intensity of international
supervision and the level of discretion afforded to domestic authorities in the restriction
of rights.108 The classification of cases can be described in concentric circles.109 The inner
circle comprises those cases where the Court has held that rights are considered so
fundamental that almost no restriction is permitted: international supervision is quite
strict and national deference is considerably reduced. The outer circle includes those
cases where the Court has granted great latitude for domestic appreciation and limited
international supervision is exercised. The middle circle is probably the largest one: here
you find an intermediate level of international scrutiny that is balanced against the MOA
of domestic authorities.110
i) Inner circle: fundamental rights and democratic rights
¶40

The first group of cases –the inner circle of the metaphorical figure—is where the
European Court has intensified its international supervision and has strictly applied the
proportionality principle, leaving slight—if any—MOA to national authorities. In some
cases, there is no mention of the MOA doctrine, but they are analyzed here because they
show that there is no national discretion in the restriction of certain rights.111 At this level,
cases are found which involve the alleged violation of fundamental rights such as the
right to life and the prohibition of torture and of inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment. In other cases, the Court says explicitly that there is only a reduced MOA
for domestic authorities. Here we find critical democratic rights that ensure political
participation, like freedom of association or political speech.
a)

¶41

Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

The Court exercises a careful scrutiny of States’ actions that allegedly violate
article 3 of the European Convention. At the time the Convention was adopted, the Court
had to deal with complex issues of state of emergency derogations112 and core

“while clear and sensible in concept, has proven highly malleable in application.” Janis, Kay & Bradley,
supra note 105, at 163.
108 This research follows the distinction proposed by García Roca, supra note 34, at 127-8. A partially
similar approach can be found in Yourow, supra note 37, at 189-91.
109 García Roca, supra note 34, at 127-8.
110 Id., at 127-8.
111 These rights are treated as “absolute rights.” As one commentator has put it, “[i]t is logically impossible
to use the principle of proportionality to delimit the scope of absolute rights. If the fair balance-test were
applied, a wider scope of protection would be recognized and the right would not be absolute.”
Christoffersen, supra note 101, at 83.
112 Cees Flinterman, Derogation From the Rights and Freedoms in Case of a Public Emergency (Article
15), in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1054-5 (Peter van Dijk
et al., eds., 4th ed., 2006) (affirming that “effective Strasbourg supervision” in the field of rights derogations
“has not yet materialized,” due to the “approach taken by the Court . . . on the basis of the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation.”).

44

Vol. 11:1]

Pablo Contreras

fundamental rights, such as the prohibition of torture.113 As was exemplified with Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the European Court developed a deferential approach to the
definition of the scope and extension of rights in forming the MOA doctrine.114 The
standard of review, however, shifted in the 1990s when the Court decided Soering v.
United Kingdom.115 The European Court held that the extradition of an individual to a
country where there are “substantial grounds” to believe that that individual faces a “real
risk” of suffering the “death row phenomenon,” constitutes a violation of the prohibition
of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment under the European Convention.116 In
Soering, the European Court reasoned that article 3 of the Convention117 contains no
exceptions and no derogations were allowed118 and no reference was made to domestic
discretion or to the MOA of national authorities. On the contrary, the decision confirmed
a European consensus rejecting the death penalty and interpreting the Convention as a
“living instrument.”119 Soering constitutes a strong precedent in the European Court’s
jurisprudence providing protection of core fundamental rights without conditions or
caveats. The Court has reaffirmed its decision and has said that “article 3 admits of no
exceptions to this fundamental value and no derogation from it is permissible under
article 15 . . .”120
¶42
The European Court case law on deportations, extraditions and/or expulsions shows
other examples of cases where a strong protection of fundamental rights can be found. In
Cruz Varas v. Sweden, a Chilean national and his family challenged a deportation ordered
by the Swedish government “because of the risk that he would be tortured by the Chilean
authorities and because of the trauma involved in being sent back to a country where he
had previously been tortured.”121 The Court decided that the criteria applied in Soering
for extradition proceedings were also applicable to expulsions, under the human rights
standards established in the European Convention. The Court reached this conclusion
although in this particular case it found that the evidence presented by the applicant was
not enough to find “substantial grounds” to believe that a breach of article 3 could happen
if the applicants were expelled to Chile. By agreeing to scrutinize deportations and
expulsions, the Court expanded the reach of article 3 to new situations. In D v. United
Kingdom, the Court found that a violation of the prohibition of torture would result from
an expulsion to another country, even if the danger of maltreatment would come from
“non-State bodies” and where the domestic authorities of the recipient State were in no

Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 41.
Yourow, supra note 37, at 15.
115 Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
116 Id. at ¶¶ 88, 91, 111. The “death row phenomenon” is described as consisting in “a combination of
circumstances to which the applicant would be exposed if, after having been extradited to Virginia to face a
capital murder charge, he were sentenced to death.” Id., at ¶ 81.
117 “Article 3. Prohibition of Torture. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.” Id. at ¶ 80, quoting European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
118 Id. at ¶ 88.
119 Id. at ¶ 102.
120 Aydin v. Turkey, App. No. 57/1996/676/866, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 81 (1997).
121 Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 68 (1991).
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condition to afford the applicant “appropriate protection.”122 This line of reasoning has
remained stable over time.123
¶43
All of these cases show a similar doctrinal pattern: no reference is made to any
MOA for domestic authorities. The Court determines if the evidence is sufficient to prove
the “real risk” of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment if the applicant is
extradited, deported or expelled. The nature of the rights involved in these cases—
considered as “fundamental” by the European Court124—eliminates any possibility of
deference to national authorities. In other words, there is no gradual application of their
scope of protection: once the conditions of their application are identified—e.g.
“substantial grounds” and “real risk” of facing maltreatment—the prohibition of article 3
of the European Convention applies in an all-or-nothing fashion.125
b)
¶44

Political speech

Another sphere of rights where the international scrutiny of restrictions is
conducted rigorously can be found with respect to democratic rights, especially when it
comes to the exercise of political speech or with respect to those rights that facilitate
political participation in a democratic society. Political speech has been strongly
protected and the Court has allowed almost no room for national discretion in its
restriction. This standard of international review was set forth in Lingens v. Austria,
where an Austrian journalist criticized the President of the National Liberal Party of
Austria for his past connection to the Nazi party and the SS.126 Criminal proceedings
were instituted against Lingens, who was finally convicted of defamation under Austrian
criminal law.127 The Court had to decide whether the criminal conviction of the journalist
was “necessary in a democratic society.” The State justified the conviction in the
protection of “the reputation or rights of others.” The Court’s decision acknowledged an
MOA with respect to local bodies in the assessment of a “pressing social need” that
would justify the interference with Lingen’s freedom of expression but, at the same time,
made it clear that such deference is followed by international supervision.128 In exercising
its international review, the European Court declared that “freedom of political debate is
at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the
[European Convention]” and, therefore, “[t]he limits of acceptable criticism are
122 D v. United Kingdom, App. No. 146/1996/767/964, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 49 (1997); see also id. at ¶ 51 (in
this case, the applicant was suffering a terminal and incurable disease).
123 See, Ahmed v. Austria, App. No. 25964/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996) (holding that an expulsion to Somalia
would entail a violation of Article 3 where the applicant faced a “real risk” to be subject to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment by one of the factions of the local civil war); see also H. L. R. v. France,
App. No. 24573/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) (where it reaffirmed the principle that Article 3 applies to
potential maltreatment by groups or persons who are not public officials—in this context, the guerrilla
groups in Colombia—but did not found sufficient evidence on the real danger faced).
124 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 226 (according to Meron, these rights should be deemed as ius cogens
rules of Public International Law, due to its non-derogable nature under the major human rights treaties);
see also Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM J. INT’L L. 1, 15-17
(1986).
125 On the gradual or all-or-nothing application of fundamental rights, see Alexy, supra note 102, at 44ff.
126 Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 12-14 (1986).
127 Id. at ¶ 35.
128 Id. at ¶ 39.
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accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual.”129
The Court held that the newspaper articles “dealt with political issues of public interest”
and the defamation conviction was “liable to hamper the press in performing its task as
purveyor of information and public watchdog.”130 In this case, the European Court held
that the conviction was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and constituted a
breach of freedom of expression under the Convention. The Court, by applying the
proportionality principle to scrutinize the restriction, reduced to the minimum the MOA
provided to domestic authorities. The Court reaffirmed the “core” nature of political
speech and the protection of freedom of speech in a democratic society, by finding other
breaches of article 10 in generic defamation cases—such as convictions for “insulting the
Government”131 —and specific defamation cases involving civil servants in the exercise
of their public functions.132 The European Court has constantly upheld the “freedom of
political debate.”133
c)
¶45

Freedom of association

Similar democratic rights, such as freedom of association, have been protected by
an equally stringent standard of international judicial review. In United Communist Party
of Turkey v. Turkey,134 the Court had to deal with the issue of whether the dissolution of
the communist party ordered by the Turkish Constitutional Court was compatible with
Turkey’s Convention obligations. The Court held that political parties “are a form of
association essential to the proper functioning of democracy. In view of the importance of
democracy in the Convention system . . . , there can be no doubt that political parties
come within the scope of article 11.”135 The Court did not deny the discretion of States to
dissolve those political parties that might seek to undermine “the constitutional structures
of the State” but instead found that such decision could only be executed in accordance
with the obligations of the European Convention.136 In determining if the drastic measure
of banning a particular political party was “necessary in a democratic society”, the
European Court affirmed that article 11137—which protects freedom of association—
Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
131 Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992).
132 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992).
133 See, e. g., Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 11662/85, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 59 (1991); Fressoz and Roire
v. France, App. No. 29183/85, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 45 (1999); Bergens Tidende and Others v. Finland, App.
No. 26132/95, Eur. Ct. H. R., at ¶ 49 (2000); Sabou and Pircalab v. Romania, App. No. 46572/99, Eur. Ct.
H.R., at ¶¶ 33-34 (2004).
134 Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 133/1996/752/951, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998).
135 Id. at ¶ 25.
136 Id. at ¶ 27.
137 European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 11.
“Article 11. Freedom of assembly and association.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of
these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”
129
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should be “considered in the light of article 10”—which establishes freedom of speech.138
This interconnection is not an accidental finding. It is based on the overarching function
that these liberties play in a democratic society, especially by assuring political
pluralism.139 This framework of analysis emphasizes the importance of democracy as a
fundamental part of the “European public order” and led the Court to say that “[i]n
determining whether a necessity within the meaning of article 11(2) exists, the
Contracting States have only a limited margin of appreciation, which goes hand in hand
with rigorous European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying
it, including those given by independent courts . . .”140 The European Court expressly
admits a different standard of review for the restrictions of democratic freedoms than is
employed for other rights and freedoms and a lesser latitude is also given for national
discretion. Applying this doctrine, the Court found that Turkey had violated the
applicants’ freedom of association under the European Convention.141 In a later case,
however, the Court ratified the national dissolution of the Turkish Welfare Party, a
political party that purported to apply of Islamic principles that were incompatible with
the secular principle of the Turkish Constitution.142 The European Court said that only
“compelling reasons” could justify these types of drastic measures, although it relied
largely on the national authorities’ judgment for the “appropriate timing for dissolution”
of the political party and the “main grounds” that validated the decision.143
ii) Outer circle: property rights
¶46

A completely different standard of review can be found when we turn to cases
dealing with property rights. The European Court has acknowledged a wide MOA for
national authorities in the domestic regulations of these rights by trying to strike a
balance between the local peculiarities of each State party and the regional human rights
standards.
¶47
In this outer circle it is possible to find cases reviewing interferences with the right
to property, a right established in article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European
Convention.144 From a general point of view, the European Court has accepted
restrictions here that are in accordance with the “general interest” and, in principle, it has
acknowledged that national authorities are in a better position to appreciate and judge

Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
140 Id. at ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at ¶ 61.
142 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and
41344/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
143 Id. at ¶¶ 100, 102, 116, 135.
144 European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
“Article 1. Protection of property.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
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such interests of a given community.145 The Court has established a balance and
proportionality criteria in reviewing interferences with the right to private property. In
Fredin v. Sweden, the Court analyzed the validity of the revocation of a permit to exploit
gravel in light of environmental concerns.146 In deciding the case, the Court said that an
interference with the right to property protected under article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must
“achieve a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the community
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”147 That
“fair balance” is defined as “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim pursued,” and the European Court explicitly recognized
“that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regards both to choosing the
means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are
justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in
question.”148 The Court found that the revocation of the permit was not disproportionate
to the legitimate environmental aim pursued by the Swedish government.
¶48
This same “wide” margin of appreciation has been accepted in other situations as
well. The European Court has upheld changes in the legislation regulating leases –a “rent
reduction law”– for the purpose of reducing “excessive and unjustified disparities
between rents for equivalent apartments and to combat property speculation.”149 The
legitimate aim pursued by the government, in these cases, was not “manifestly
unreasonable” according to the Court.150 The decision emphasized that in the field of
“remedial social legislation” it is appropriate for the legislature to choose among the most
efficacious measures available.151 The European Court has stressed similar latitude in
other cases involving the domestic regulation of debt adjustments situations and the
market of credits and loans.152 The concept of “public interest” for the purposes of article
1, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention has been defined as “necessarily
extensive” and the Court recognizes that “[t]he national authorities are in principle better
placed than the international judge to appreciate what is ‘in the public interest,’” finding
“natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social
and economic policies should be a wide one.”153 The same deferential approach can be
seen in cases dealing with pension rights covered under the aforementioned provision,154
although the European Court has asserted that there is a limit when the “essence” of the
pension rights has been impaired.155

García Roca, supra note 34, at 139.
Fredin v. Sweden, App. No. 12033/86, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 39 (1991).
147 Id. at ¶ 51.
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 Mellacher and Others v. Austria, App. No. 10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 47 (1989).
150 Id.
151 Id. at ¶ 51.
152 Bäck v. Finland, App. No. 37598/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
153 Id. at ¶ 53.
154 Kjartan Asmundsson v. Iceland, App. No. 60669/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
155 Domalewski v. Poland, App. No. 34610/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). The same expression has been used in
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention. States “have a wide margin of appreciation in this
sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1
have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to
such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed
145
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The recognition of a different level of review for laws that interfere with the right
to private property shows how differently the Court has applied the MOA doctrine in
different contexts. The European Court relies almost exclusively on the State’s definition
of the legitimate aim involved in these cases and its application of the proportionality test
is lax.
iii) Middle circle: freedom of religion and right to privacy

¶50

An intermediate level of scrutiny is applied in another group of cases. The different
rights involved and the interpretative criteria adopted by the European Court give support
to Viljaen’s criticism of the aimless or non-systematic approach upon which the Court
decides cases by using the proportionality principle and the MOA doctrine.156
a)

Free speech and blasphemy cases

¶51

A good starting point is to look at the MOA doctrine in connection with the
restriction of rights found in blasphemy cases that dealt with the limits of freedom of
expression. These cases show a similar pattern. First, there is an interference with the
right of freedom of expression that is justified under the legitimate aim of protecting “the
rights of others” to freedom of religion. Under this framework, the Court has upheld as
compatible with the European Convention the seizure and forfeiture of a blasphemous
film157 and the refusal to grant a distribution certificate for a video considered
blasphemous.158 The European Court considered, in the first case, that the film attacked
the Roman Catholic religion—which is the religion of the “overwhelming majority of
Tyroleans” in Austria—and the Court held that, in seizing the film, the domestic
authorities had “acted to ensure religious peace in that region” and to prevent some
people from feeling that “their religious beliefs [had been attacked] in an unwarranted
and offensive manner.”159 The Court determined that the domestic authorities did not
overstep their MOA under these circumstances.
¶52
In the second case, the Court acknowledged different levels of scrutiny in
reviewing the restriction or interference with the right to freedom of expression. The
European Court explicitly stated that
[w]hereas there is little scope under [article 10(2)] for restrictions on
political speech or on debate of questions of public interest . . . a wider
margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States
when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or,
especially, religion. Moreover, as in the field of morals, and perhaps to an
even greater degree, there is no uniform European conception of the
in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate.” See Latiba v. Italy,
App. No. 26772/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 201 (2000) (emphasis added).
156 Viljaen, supra note 107, at 249-51.
157 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
158 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996).
159 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 56 (1994).
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requirements of ‘the protection of the rights of others’ in relation to attacks
on their religious convictions.160
¶53

The MOA doctrine imposes two levels of scrutiny, depending on the content of the
speech. For restrictions on political speech there is almost no national discretion
available, but more latitude is afforded when restrictions on speech are justified under the
guise of the protection of the religious rights of others. The decision in the latter case said
also that national authorities were in a better position to judge the potential effects of
these attacks and the necessity restricting a right, due to their “direct and continuous
contact with the vital forces of their countries.”161 International supervision in these
blasphemy cases, according to the decision, is only limited to review the “risks of
arbitrary or excessive interferences” with freedom of expression.162
b)

Freedom of religion

¶54

A second set of cases showing different levels of domestic discretion is found in
the exigencies of democratic pluralistic societies and the wearing of religious clothing or
the display of religious symbols in the public space. There is an inherent tension in these
cases between the principle of secularism—which has been considered to be consistent
with the values underlying the ECHR—and the freedom of religion.163 The jurisprudence
of the Court has been particularly deferential in some cases where States have prohibited
wearing the Islamic veil in public places, as in France and Turkey. In Sahin v. Turkey, the
European Court compared the different European national legal systems on the issue of
the Islamic veil and noted that there was a lack of consensus among States Parties,
concluding that there was no “uniform conception of the significance of religion in
society and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief will differ
according to time and context.”164 It appears that when there is no regional consensus,
international supervision decreases in intensity and the Court provides a great deal of
leeway to domestic authorities in the regulation of rights. In this particular case, the issue
at stake was the validity of a Turkish university’s ban on the wearing of the Islamic veil.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court held that, in the context of Turkish society
where the veil has adopted political significance and may affect the equality of women,
the “pressing social need” to suppress the veil was properly justified by national
authorities.165 The Court reaffirmed the exercise of the MOA in these cases involving
prohibitions on the use of religious garments.166
¶55
The display of religious symbols in public schools constitutes another example of
the deference that the European Court has afforded to domestic authorities. In the
controversial case Lautsi v. Italy, the presence of crucifixes in an Italian State-school—as
Wingrove v. United Kingdom, supra note 158, at ¶ 58 (emphasis added).
Id.
162 Id.
163 Rafaella Nigro, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the European Court of
Human Rights on the Islamic Veil, 11 H. R. REV. 531, 539 (2010).
164 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 29 (2005).
165 Id. at ¶¶ 115, 122.
166 See generally, Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) (admissibility decision).

160

161

51

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2012

part of an Italian tradition—was part of the MOA of the State.167 Italy argued that the
presence of crucifixes was the result of the State’s “historical development” and that the
symbol did not have only a “religious connotation” but also “symbolized the principles
and values which formed the foundation of democracy and western civilization.”168 The
Court granted special consideration to the fact “that Europe is marked by a great diversity
between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the sphere of cultural and
historical development.”169 The decision upheld the MOA of national authorities in
reconciling “education and teaching with respect for the right of parents to ensure such
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.”170 In the European Court’s proportionality review, the lack of a European
consensus on the issue of crucifixes display was critical in defining the extension of
freedom of religion. The Court concluded that the symbols do not coerce children with
respect to religion—the mere display was insufficient “to denote a process of
indoctrination”171—and therefore, the national authorities had discretion under the
Convention to act as they did.172
c)

Privacy, sodomy and transsexuals’ rights
¶56
Notwithstanding these clear examples of wide deference to States in the definition
of rights and their limits, the MOA doctrine has proved its malleability in the progressive
development and crystallization of gay rights under the European Convention. The first
line of cases dealt with the national criminal offences prohibiting sodomy, which were
declared to be violations of the right to respect for the individuals’ private life,
established in article 8 of the European Convention.173 The Court acknowledged the
MOA of domestic authorities in “the initial assessment of the pressing social need in each
case” that might justify the restriction of the right enshrined in article 8, but the Court
recognized that certain factors are critical in the definition of the scope of that margin,
such as the “nature of the aim of the restriction” and the “nature of the activities
involved” in it.174 In these cases, States were attempting to impose a penal or criminal
sanction for a conduct that concerned one of the “most intimate aspect[s] of private life,”
demanding “particularly serious reasons” to justify the restriction of the rights
involved.175 The European Court considered that reasons such as the “need for caution
and for sensitivity to public opinion in Northern Ireland” —although evident—were not
sufficient to satisfy the “necessity” requirement of the proportionality review.176 The
Court compared the Irish legislation with the “great majority” of the member States of the
Council of Europe—in sharp contrast to the lack of regional consensus as in other
cases—and determined that the “marked changes” towards decriminalization of this
Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
Id. at ¶ 67.
169 Id. at ¶ 68.
170 Id. at ¶ 69.
171 Id. at ¶ 71. The Court considered the crucifix as an “essentially passive symbol.” Id. at ¶ 72.
172 Id. at ¶ 76.
173 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1983); Norris v. Ireland, App. No.
10581/83, Eur. Ct. H.R., (1988).
174 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 52 (1983).
175 Id.
176 Id. at ¶ 58.
167
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conduct cannot justify the “pressing social need” required to validly restrict the right to
respect private life.177 The European consensus, in this case, served as a yardstick to
reject interferences with an intimate sphere of personal autonomy. The Court reaffirmed
this holding in Norris v. Ireland where it stated that the respondent government did not
present new evidence “which would point to the existence of factors justifying the
retention of the impugned laws which are additional to or are of greater weight than those
present in the aforementioned Dudgeon case.”178 The standard of review in these
decisions has been adopted in other cases involving homosexuals, particularly one
challenging the discriminatory policy of the British Armed Forces excluding them from
service.179 While the Court noted the MOA granted to States Parties—especially in the
field of national security—it found no specific examples and justifications that could
sustain the alleged argument that protection of gay rights would diminish the forces’
morale.180 All of these cases show a strict international scrutiny, reducing the MOA of
domestic authorities at its minimum.
¶57
Finally, we should note the evolution of the scope of review and the scrutiny
standard used by the European Court in addressing cases involving transsexual rights.
The Court adopts, in these cases, an “evolutive technique of interpretation” in defining
the MOA of States parties and, consequently, in evaluating the proportionality of
domestic interferences on rights and the extension of the Convention obligations.181 The
international scrutiny exercised by the Court evolves from a wide MOA for States Parties
in the initial cases, to denying domestic discretion in later decisions. The
absence/presence of regional consensus in a given matter may affect the intensity of the
proportionality review and the leeway allowed to States Parties. The transsexuals’ rights
cases show the evolution of the Court’s review. In one of the first major decisions on
transsexual rights’ issues, Rees v. United Kingdom, the applicant complained that several
legal and social constraints—most prominently, his inability to change his sex
classification in his birth certificate—affected his capability to fully integrate into society
and violated his right to a private life.182 The case involved the positive duties of States
under article 8 of the ECHR183 and the Court held that there was, “at present[,] little
common ground between the Contracting States in this area and that, generally speaking,
the law appear[ed] to be in a transitional stage” and, therefore, the Court afforded a
“wide” MOA to States parties.184 It consequently ruled that there was no violation of
Article 8 at that time. The Court maintained its interpretation in new cases filed after Rees
and stated that States parties to the European Convention enjoyed a wide MOA and that
there was still “no generally shared approach” to this issue among them.185 The trend,
Id. at ¶ 60.
Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 46 (1988).
179 Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
180 Id. at ¶¶ 81, 82, 90.
181 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 197-203.
182 The applicant was “recorded in the register of births as a female” and later sought a hormonal treatment
to turn into a male. In the decision, the applicant is referred to as a “he.” Rees v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 9532/81, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶¶ 12-13 (1986).
183 Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 33, at 727.
184 Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶ 37 (1986).
185 Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10834/84, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶ 40 (1990); Sheffield and
Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22985/93 and 23390/94, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶¶ 57-58.
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however, shifted dramatically in 2002, when the Court overruled its previous decisions
and accepted that “changing conditions” within the United Kingdom and in regard to the
European consensus—in connection with a “dynamic and evolutive approach” to the
interpretation of the Convention—were key considerations that might lead to finding a
violation of article 8.186 The Court looked to the conduct of the State party “in the light of
present-day conditions” and it expanded its proportionality review and reduced the MOA
of the United Kingdom. The State’s failure to guarantee a change in the legal birth
certificate impacted different spheres of the applicant’s life—pension, retirement age, etc.
—thus, constituting a violation of article 8 of the Convention. In addition, the Court
found “no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying the right to marry under
any circumstances.”187
d)
¶58

Synthesis

Contrasting the groups of cases in this section, one can notice the different levels
and layers of discretion and deference that the MOA doctrine may provide to the
European Court in assessing the proportionality of domestic rights’ restrictions. Even
when it comes to the same right—e.g. freedom of expression—the level of scrutiny may
differ, depending on the type of speech and the legitimate aim sought to be protected by
domestic authorities.188 In other cases, the same right may afford more or less protection
depending on the level of agreement or consensus among the European Convention
States Parties. Since that consensus may vary over time, the standard of review could get
more rigorous over time, as the transsexual rights cases show.
D. Conclusion

¶59

The European Court case law shows how the MOA doctrine has played a
determinant role in articulating and solving hard cases under the European Convention.
Developed first in the context of rights’ derogations by the European Commission, the
doctrine has been applied expansively to create a zone of domestic discretion in the
regulation of rights at large. Deference, nonetheless, varies from right to right and the
MOA analysis is always based on the particularities of each case. By combining the
contributions of Letsas and García Roca, this section shows both the different levels of
domestic discretion in the restrictions of rights and also the organizational features in the
distribution of power between the European Court and national authorities.
¶60
The relevance of the MOA doctrine lies in the ultimate definition of the rights’
scope of protection under the European Convention. The MOA appears as the other side
of the proportionality review. The application of either of them shapes the extension of
the European Convention rights, especially in freedom of expression and freedom of
186 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶7 4 (2002); I v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, Eur. Ct. of H. R. (2002).
187 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, Eur. Ct. of H. R., at ¶7 5, 103 (2002).
188 See Paul Mahoney, Universality Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech:
Explaining Some Recent Judgements, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 364, 378 (1997) (“One can infer from
Strasbourg case law on free speech generally that different kinds of speech enjoy different levels of
protection, with journalistic speech –the public watchdog– coming near the top end of the sliding scale and
artistic speech somewhat lower down the scale.”).
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religion issues. They also help understanding the evolution and changes of the Court’s
decisions, especially in the field of gay rights. The major problem of the doctrine is, at
the same time, its most praised advantage: its flexibility and malleability in adjusting
different States’ particularities with supranational human rights standards. The fact that
the Court has been cautious in the exercise of international review does not preclude the
possibility that, in the near future, the discretion afforded to domestic authorities—which
goes “hand in hand” with international supervision—may shrink noticeably. Supervision
may intensify if regional consensus increases or decreases, on any given matter.
III. NATIONAL DISCRETION AND INTERNATIONAL DEFERENCE UNDER THE INTERAMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
¶61

The paper now turns to the Inter-American human rights system. The background
and the types of cases differ significantly from the European context. In addition, the
MOA doctrine is not an original creation of the Inter-American Court, so there is still
considerable discussion as to whether the Court should apply such standard of review at
all.189 This section begins by describing the main differences between the European and
the Inter-American systems. From there, the paper examines the cases in which the InterAmerican Court has directly applied the MOA doctrine to decide the issue at stake. The
section then reviews the literature’s discussion on the pros and cons of that doctrine. The
last part of the section groups cases concerning the levels of scrutiny exercised by the
Inter-American Court regarding different rights. Forced disappearances, extrajudicial
killings, and acts of torture do not leave any room for international deference. Strict
scrutiny is also exercised in cases concerning vulnerable groups—such as women and
indigenous peoples—and free speech issues. An emerging set of cases is posing new
dilemmas to the Court and that is explored as well, focusing on the standard of review of
regulations upon the right to participate in the government. The section ends by
reviewing how the Court affords deference to national authorities when it applies a
proportionality review of domestic restrictive measures.
A. The context of the Inter-American human rights system

¶62

The role of the Inter-American Court and its jurisprudence are better understood by
reviewing two major contextual differences with the European Court. The first difference
is a historical one:190 the Inter-American Court decided its first contentious case almost
20 years after the European Court. The American Convention was adopted in 1969 and
entered in force in 1978.191 The Inter-American Court started its functions the following
year. Despite the 1979 start date, the Court delivered its first contentious opinion only in
1988, in the famous Velásquez Rodríguez case.192 By contrast, the European Court

See infra III, 3.
A brief history of the Inter-American Court can be found in its web site, I/A Court History, CORTE
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm.
191 See United Nations Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1.
192 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
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decided its first case in 1961. 193 The Inter-American Court, therefore, has acted in a
shorter period of time than the European Court. By the time the Court activated, several
important human rights treaties had already been adopted194 and international bodies had
delivered general comments or decisions on different human rights issues195 (most
prominently among them, the European Court). This global and regional body of human
rights legal ideas provided a different starting point for the Inter-American Court. In other
words, it did not have to start from scratch to develop arguments or to justify doctrinal
decisions on issues that already had been decided by others. Indeed, the Court has openly
cited to other courts’ decisions or international organizations resolutions.196 It is not clear,
however, why the Inter-American Court did not adopt the MOA doctrine that was already
part of the European Court’s jurisprudence. It seems that the Inter-American Court, by
deciding on things long settled in international human rights law and by referring to other
courts’ decisions, asserts its own definition on the meaning and scope of the Convention
rights. At the same time, as will be discussed below, the Court strengthens its own case
law by converging towards a universal meaning of human rights obligations, even though
the American Convention establishes only regional mandates and prohibitions.
¶63
The second difference between the Inter-American and the European Court lies in
the type of cases decided by each system. The former has dealt mostly with cases
involving arbitrary arrests or detentions, forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings
or, in general terms, violations to the right to life, to personal liberty, and to the right to
personal integrity.197 In the second half of 20th century, the majority of Latin American
countries were ruled by military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes where systematic
and massive violations of human rights were taking place.198 When new democratic
regimes ratified the American Convention, they had to confront the past violations of
rights (not always successfully). In contrast, Western Europe, subject to the European
Convention, was comprised initially of a small number of democratic States—ten of
them—when the Convention went into force in 1953. In that context, cases brought
Lawless v. Ireland was the first merits decision adopted by the European Court. See Lawless v. Ireland,
App. No. 332/57, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1961).
194 Davidson, supra note 6, at 31 (stating that the American Convention used, as references and “source[s]
of inspiration,” the European Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
195 Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an
Ox, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds.,
1998) (noting how the European institutions—the Court and the Commission—served as models for the
Inter-American system).
196 There are many examples on this. See, e. g., on free speech cases, Fontovecchia y D’Amico v.
Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 54 (Nov. 29,
2011) (citing the European Court); on right to property cases, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v.
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 157 (Aug. 24,
2010) (citing the Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization); on children’s rights, Case
of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 134, ¶¶ 154, 157 (Sept. 15, 2005) (citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the reports
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), among many decisions.
197 Farer, supra note 195, at 42-46.
198 David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, in THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998). Describing
the violations of human rights by those military dictatorships, see WOLFGANG S. HEINZ & HUGO FRÜLING,
DETERMINANTS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY STATE AND STATE-SPONSORED ACTORS IN
BRAZIL, URUGUAY, CHILE AND ARGENTINA, passim (1999).
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before the European Court concerned issues of allegedly invalid restrictions of human
rights by democratic governments.199 The types of cases before the Inter-American Court
is a crucial factor that has determined the way that this court has reduced the margin of
national discretion.
B. The idea of the MOA doctrine in the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence
¶64

There are only a few decisions in which the Inter-American Court has relied upon
the MOA doctrine. The Court used the concept initially in an advisory opinion and has
cited it later in recent decisions. This part of the paper analyzes the use and justification
of the MOA doctrine in the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
1. The MOA doctrine in advisory opinions

¶65

The first time that the Inter-American Court used the expression “margin of
appreciation” was in a 1984 advisory opinion concerning proposed amendments to the
constitutional rules regulating naturalization in Costa Rica.200 The opinion addressed the
alleged incompatibilities of the constitutional amendments proposed with the right to
nationality201 and the right to equal protection202 established in the American Convention.
The amendment required a different period of residence as condition for someone to
acquire the Costa Rican nationality, “depending on whether the applicants qualify as
native-born nationals of ‘other countries of Central America, Spaniards and IberoAmericans’ or whether they acquired the nationality of those countries by
naturalization.”203 The Court had to decide whether the different treatment was in
accordance with the right to equality and the opinion borrowed what the European Court
held in the Belgium Linguistic Case,204 where it was stated that only those differences
having “no objective and reasonable justification” can be considered discriminatory
under the American Convention.205 From this basis, the Court reasoned that, in
addressing cases regarding different treatment, it should be recognized that “[o]ne is here
Harris, supra note 198, at 2 (stating that cases, at the Inter-American system, “have been much more to
do with the forced disappearance, killing, torture and arbitrary detention of political opponents and
terrorists than with particular issues concerning, for example, the right to a fair trial or freedom of
expression that are the stock in the trade of the European Commission and Court.”).
200 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984).
201 American Convention, supra note 3, at art. 20:
“Article 20. Right to Nationality
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not
have the right to any other nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.”
202 Id. at art. 24:
“Article 24. Right to Equal Protection
All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal
protection of the law.”
203 Proposed Amendments, supra note 200, at ¶52.
204 In the case “relating to certain aspects of the law on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v.
Belgium, App. Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1968).
205 Proposed Amendments, supra note 200, at ¶56.
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dealing with values which take on concrete dimensions in the face of those real situations
in which they have to be applied and which permit in each case a certain margin of
appreciation in giving expression to them.”206 The cited paragraph, however, did not
quote any European Court’s decision relying on such doctrine.207 For the Court,
there is no doubt that it is within the sovereign power of Costa Rica to
decide what standards should determine the granting or denial of
nationality to aliens who seek it, and to establish certain reasonable
differentiations based on factual differences which, viewed objectively,
recognize that some applicants have a closer affinity than others to Costa
Rica’s value system and interests.208
¶66

The Inter-American Court, under such standard of deference, went on to decide the
particularities of the proposed amendments, which were found to be consistent with the
right to equality. For example, the differentiation between residence requirements for
Central Americans, Ibero-Americans and Spaniards was justified in terms of the
“historical, cultural and spiritual bonds with the people of Costa Rica.”209 Even in
differences regarding those individuals that acquired nationality by birth and those by
naturalization, the Court wrote that it was “fully mindful of the margin of appreciation
which is reserved to states when it comes to the establishment of requirements for the
acquisition of nationality and the determination whether they have been complied
with[,]” considering them as compatible with the American Convention.210 The Court
also accepted as valid the condition demanding a proof of ability to “speak, write and
read” the Spanish language or an exam about the country’s history, for the purposes of
acquiring the Costa Rican nationality. The decision summarized the deference granted to
national authorities in the following terms: “[t]hese conditions can be deemed, prima
facie, to fall within the margin of appreciation reserved to the state as far as concerns the
enactment and assessment of the requirements designed to ensure the existence of real
and effective links upon which to base the acquisition of the new nationality.”211
¶67
This initial formulation of the MOA in the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence
follows the European doctrine. Despite the absence of explicit references to its European
counterpart, the margin reserved to States allows certain domestic discretion—denoted
especially by the use of the Latin expression “prima facie.” The Court also—and again,
similarly to the European Court– retained the power to exercise international supervision
over State actions regulating or restricting rights.

Id. at ¶ 58 (emphasis added).
The advisory opinion only cites the Belgium Linguistic case in ¶¶ 12 and 56, but only for the purposes
of developing the standard to review differences in treatment and the right to equality and not to justify the
MOA doctrine.
208 Proposed Amendments, supra note 200, at ¶ 59.
209 Id. at ¶ 60.
210 Id. at ¶ 62 (emphasis added).
211 Id. at ¶ 63 (underlining in original, italicized emphasis added). The Inter-American Court found,
however, one potential violation with the American Convention: the different treatment between a married
and a single woman for the purposes of acquiring the Costa Rican nationality. Id. at ¶ 67. No mention to the
MOA of the State is made in this hypothesis.
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¶68

Some differences between the Inter-American and the European use of the MOA
doctrine should be noted. One major difference is that the MOA doctrine is invoked in
this particular case without any reference to the principle of proportionality. As indicated
earlier in the paper, the European Court always seeks to strike a balance between the
proportionality of a restricting measure and the discretion that national authorities enjoy
under the MOA.212 On a similar note, the Inter-American Court did not mention anything
on the whether the aim of restrictive measures should satisfy a “pressing social need,” a
standard well consolidated in the European Court’s case-law.213 As will be discussed
below, this prong of the system of rights restrictions will come one year later with
another advisory opinion and the case law on free speech.214
¶69
Two arguments shed more light on the limits of this first formulation of the MOA
doctrine by the Inter-American Court. The Court was delivering one of its initial advisory
opinions and the decision concerned a constitutional amendment. The advisory opinion
should be understood in light of the limitations concerning review powers of the Court in
addressing abstract questions on the American Convention. This was the Court’s fourth
advisory opinion and, by that time, it had not decided any contentious case. In that
context, a cautious holding was strategically recommended. Secondly, the opinion
analyzed the proposal for constitutional amendments, and the subject matter of the
opinion might have also contributed to a moderate international supervision. The reform
of a national constitution in matters of nationality and naturalization is intimately
connected to the republican self-definition of the human group that may constitute a
democratic community in a given territory. Although the Court has found that national
constitutions may violate the American Convention,215 the constitutional definition of
nationality requirements may have influenced a certain leeway for the Costa Rican
constituent power.
2. The MOA in contentious cases
¶70

The MOA doctrine was not used in any other Inter-American Court decision until
2004. In Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, the Inter-American Court analyzed the State’s
alleged violations of free speech, in the case of a journalist convicted for the crime of
publishing offenses constituting defamation.216 The Court reviewed the scope of valid
restrictions that States may apply to an individual’s freedom of expression in political
speech matters. The Court said that “[d]emocratic control exercised by society through
public opinion encourages the transparency of State activities and promotes the
accountability of public officials in public administration, for which there should be a
reduced margin for any restriction on political debates or on debates on matters of public
interest.”217 Although the Court did not use the whole expression “margin of

See supra II, 3.3.
See supra II, 2.
214 See infra III, 4.3,3.
215 “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 72 (Feb. 5, 2001).
216 Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107 (July 2, 2004).
217 Id. at ¶ 127 (emphasis added).
212
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appreciation,” the context shows that the decision is referring to such a concept.218 The
employment of the MOA concept is made with the deliberate purpose to ascertain a
reduced scope of valid restrictions to freedom of expression under the American
Convention. This is similar to the approach of limited and reduced national discretion
adopted by the European Court in matters of political speech.219 The Inter-American
Court has held that statements concerning public officials—and/or private individuals
that exercise public functions—should have “a certain latitude in the broad debate on
matters of public interest that is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic
system.”220 Such “latitude” implies a severe reduction of national discretion in restricting
freedom of expression.
¶71
In the same decision, the Court also recognizes that States have an MOA in
determining the legal regulation of the right to a judicial remedy for the effective
protection of human rights.221 Again, as in the issue of the violation on the journalist’s
freedom of expression, the Court uses the concept of MOA in a reduced fashion. The
decision stated that “[w]hile States have a margin of discretion in regulating the exercise
of that remedy, they may not establish restrictions or requirements inimical to the very
essence of the right to appeal a judgment.”222 The English version of the decision
employed the phrase “margin of discretion.” However, the decision was originally
written in Spanish and it used the expression “margen de apreciación.” The original
paragraph reads as follows: “[s]i bien los Estados tienen un margen de apreciación para
regular el ejercicio de ese recurso, no pueden establecer restricciones o requisitos que
infrinjan la esencia misma del derecho de recurrir del fallo.” It could be a mistaken
translation from Spanish to English.
¶72
According to this, States have national discretion in the legal regulation of judicial
remedies but international supervision can review if the “essence” of the right has been
impaired. After the Herrera-Ulloa decision, the Court has not referred to the MOA
doctrine in its decisions, except for concurring or partially dissenting opinions that certain
members of the Court have delivered in recent cases.223
The decision cites two European Court’s decisions using the MOA doctrine. See id. citing Feldek v.
Slovakia, App. No. 29032/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 73, 78 (Jul. 12, 2001); Sürek and Özdemir, App. No.
26682/85, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 58, 61 (Jul. 8, 1999).
219 See supra II, 3.3.1.2.
220 Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 10, ¶ 128 (July 2, 2004).
221 Id. at ¶ 161.
222 Id. (emphasis added).
223 See Cabrera-García and Montiel-Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220 (Nov. 26, 2010); Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012) (available
only in Spanish). These individual opinions have addressed the “control of compliance” (control de
convencionalidad) mandate established by the Inter-American Court and they have analyzed some of the
issues that arise in connection to the MOA of domestic authorities. Although the Inter-American Court’s
decisions in Spanish use the same concept in each case (control de convencionalidad), some English
translations use the term “conventionality control.” The Court defined the mandate in the following terms:
when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as
part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all the effects
of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of
laws which are contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since their
inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of ‘conventionality control’ between
218
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C. The debate in the Americas on the use of the MOA doctrine

¶73

This section analyzes the scholarly debate on the advantages or disadvantages of
using the MOA doctrine to interpret the human rights obligations established in the
American Convention. The Inter-American Court has used this concept only in two
opportunities, and with different results. This limited use may explain why commentators
have not considered the Inter-American use of the MOA doctrine in major depth. The
debate could be summarized in three different positions found across the literature. The
first position rejects the use of the MOA doctrine in the Inter-American Court’s
jurisprudence.224 A completely opposite thesis—a second position—is also found, where
some commentators have pushed towards the adoption of a deference doctrine for
domestic authorities under the American Convention.225 A third position—an
intermediate one—does not necessarily reject the use of an MOA doctrine, but stresses
the need to have a cautious approach to that concept under the rules of the Convention
and the jurisprudence of the Court.226 Each position is explained separately.
1. Frontal opposition to the use of the MOA doctrine in the interpretation of the
American Convention

¶74

Perhaps the most popular thesis regarding the use of the MOA doctrine in the
interpretation of the American Convention is the one that rejects this doctrine completely.
The former President of the Inter-American Court, Antonio Cançado Trindade—now one
of the judges of the International Court of Justice—has written on the subject, denying
any room under the American Convention system for such doctrine.227 Judge Cançado
stated, in 1998, that the MOA doctrine has not been adopted by the Inter-American
the domestic legal provisions that are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on
Human Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty,
but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate
interpreter of the American Convention.
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 124 (Sept. 26, 2006) (emphasis added). This paper does not address
the “control of compliance” mandate. See Juan Carlos Hitters, Control de Constitucionalidad y Control de
Convencionalidad. Comparación (Criterios Fijados por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), 7
ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 109 (2009); Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Obligaciones Internacionales y Control
de Convencionalidad, 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 117 (2010).
224 Antonio Cançado Trindade, Reflexiones sobre el Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de
los Derechos Humanos, in EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN A LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS (Juan E. Méndez & Francisco Cox eds., 1998).
225 Sergio Verdugo & José Francisco García, Radiografía al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos, 25 REV. ACTUALIDAD JURÍDICA 175 (2012). An earlier version of their ideas can be found in
Sergio Verdugo & José Francisco García, Radiografía Política al Sistema Interamericano de DD.HH.
(Dec. 2011), http://www.lyd.com/wp-content/files_mf/sij7radiografiapoliticaalsistemainteramericanodeddh
hjfgarciaysverdugodiciembre2011.pdf.
226 Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, La Protección de la Libertad de Expresión en el Sistema Interamericano de
Derechos Humanos y la Promoción de la Democracia, 13 REVISTA DE DERECHO (UNIVERSIDAD DE
VALDIVIA) 225 (2002); Víctor Abramovich, Autonomía y Subsidiariedad. El Sistema Interamericano de
derechos Humanos frente a los Sistemas de Justicia Nacionales, in EL DERECHO EN AMÉRICA LATINA. UN
MAPA PARA EL PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO DEL SIGLO XXI (César Rodríguez Garavito coord., Siglo XXI eds.,
2011).
227 Cançado Trindade, supra note 224.

61

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2012

Court’s jurisprudence,228 although in doing so, he did not recognize the use of the
doctrine in the advisory opinion requested by the Costa Rican government.229 Despite this
omission, Cançado’s argument is based on the type of cases that the Inter-American
Court has dealt with in the past. According to him, the majority of the cases before the
Court have involved alleged violations to non-derogable rights where “no invocation of a
margin of appreciation could be conceived.”230 Cançado relies on a simple but very
strong idea: if there is no effective application of the rule of law in States Parties and
there are violations of core rights—that cannot be suspended even in times of
emergency—then there is no possible room for any MOA doctrine under the American
Convention.231
¶75
The argument relies on a normative premise and a contingent assumption. The
normative premise is easy to elucidate: no national discretion should be granted when jus
cogens human rights obligations are at stake.232 Cançado criticizes the very notion of the
MOA, purporting that the doctrine is an “artifice” created to permit a “relative application
of International Human Rights Law.”233 From this point of view, human rights—even
those established in regional instruments—should be treated as posing universal
obligations and no relativism or particularism is desirable or even conceptually
compatible with the very notion of human rights.234 Accordingly, for Judge Cançado
Trindade, there could be no different degrees of national discretion in the application of
human rights obligations under the American Convention. Brazil, Ecuador, and
Guatemala—to name some—should be held accountable to the same standard of rights
protection defined at the regional level.
¶76
The contingent assumption is different. His normative argument has been built
considering the practice of the Inter-American Court in deciding cases that have involved
gross, massive, and grave violations of human rights. Therefore, no domestic discretion is
allowed when non-derogable rights have been violated. The bloody history of past Latin
American dictatorships avails this thesis.235 The empirical evidence, however, should not
confuse our conceptual analysis. Judge Cançado is refusing to accept any degree of MOA

Id. at 582.
See supra III, 2.
230 Cançado Trindade, supra note 224, at 582.
231 Id. at 582-83. He argues also that the rejection of the application of the MOA doctrine under the
American Convention, should lead towards strengthening international mechanisms of human rights
protection.
232 Id. at 583.
233 Id. at 593. Cançado thinks that protecting and safeguarding human rights at the domestic level is mainly
possible if national authorities assume and incorporate international standards of rights protection required
by human rights treaties. Id.
234 According to Benavides, the Inter-American Court has a “universalist” tendency in interpreting the
regional treaty. María Angélica Benavides Cassals, El Consenso y el Margen de Apreciación en la
Protección de los Derechos Humanos, 15 IUS ET PRAXIS 295, 308 (2009). For Hennebel, the InterAmerican Court asserts the regional distinctiveness “through its own construction of legal universalism.”
Ludovic Hennebel, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Ambassador of Universalism, 2011
QUEBEC J. INT’L L. 57, 60 (2011).
235 See supra text accompanying note 198.
228
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for domestic authorities, concerning every right established in the American Convention,
and under any circumstance. This is an all-or-nothing rejection of the MOA doctrine.236
¶77
In addition, the argument assumes too much in its pessimistic forecast of the types
of cases that might be subject to the Court’s review. Past decisions of the Court, dealing
mostly with forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, widespread torture—among
other grave breaches—should not necessarily be the only type of alleged violations under
review. Cases concerning forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture should
tend to decrease over time. In the future, and under normal circumstances, new type of
cases might arise and other human rights issues could be brought before the Court.237
2. A doctrine of deference for domestic authorities under the American Convention
¶78

In a different vein, two Chilean commentators recently argued that the InterAmerican Court should develop a doctrine of deference to domestic authorities, citing the
European example.238 Their argument is developed under a broad critique of the
democratic deficit of the Inter-American Court. In addition, they denounce a possible
left-wing political agenda adopted by the Court in its rulings.239 According to Verdugo
and García, the lack of a doctrine of deference constitutes one of the democratic deficits
affecting the Inter-American Court’s legitimacy. The Court’s lack of a doctrine in their
opinion creates a failure to respect the autonomy of democratic states or to allow certain
levels of interpretative pluralism under the American Convention.240 Verdugo and García
are not arguing mainly for the MOA doctrine; nonetheless, they have suggested that such
doctrine or any deference doctrine could diminish the Court’s democratic legitimacy
concerns. It is not clear how much deference they believe should be granted or in what
kind of cases they believe the Court should defer to domestic authorities.
¶79
Broad support for a doctrine of deference, based on the critique of the countermajoritarian nature of international courts, overlooks the complexities and nuances of
Such reading of the American Convention assumes too much. First of all, not every right and not every
obligation under the American Convention constitutes a peremptory rule of Public International Law. The
recognition of jus cogens rules by the Inter-American Court has been restricted to certain core principles of
International Human Rights law, as will be analyzed below. It might be the case that Judge Cançado has a
broad opinion that makes extensive this jus cogens character to other obligations under the American
Convention, but that has no correlation in the Court’s jurisprudence.
237 See infra III, 4.3.4.
238 Verdugo & García, Radiografía al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, supra note 225, at
195-96.
239 Id. at 201-2. The democratic deficit critique of international human rights law is not new. See John O.
McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739,
1763-78 (2009).
240 Verdugo & García, Radiografía al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, supra note 226, at
201. Another commentator has argued that the Inter-American Court does not take into consideration
almost any separation of powers concerns in deciding States responsibilities and obligations under the
American Convention. The Court has relied on this theory only for the purposes of defining the concept of
“law” under the American Convention and when the Court has interpreted the judicial guarantees of
independence and impartiality of judges and courts. See Hugo Tórtora Aravena, La Relativa Irrelevancia
de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PÚBLICO 117-143 (Juan Carlos Ferrada Bórquez ed., 2010). Benavides
seems to be in a similar position: she argues against Judge Cançado’s position by stressing the fact that
“diversity is the result of a democratic system” and that democratic societies understand differently the
normative content of certain rights. Benavides, supra note 234, at 309.
236
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how the doctrine functions substantively. Since Verdugo and García have focused on
democratic deficit of international courts, then the legitimacy of these international
bodies should be upheld when international judicial review develops a representationreinforcing task, just like when they protect civil and political rights. In other words,
Ely’s famous argument in support of judicial review241 is compatible with a narrow—or
almost null—doctrine of deference when democratic rights violations are under
international scrutiny.
¶80
Verdugo and García tend to overlook the democratic deficits of Latin American
States themselves. Judge Cançado rejected any room for an MOA doctrine precisely
based on the lack of fully democratic states.242 Granted, Cançado was arguing in 1998
with a different background, whereas Verdugo and García are doing so in 2011-2012. In
recent years, the democratic situation has improved. To accept this change of
circumstances, however, does not lead us to assume that democratic issues have
disappeared completely in the Americas. A doctrine of deference under the American
Convention should take into consideration all of these factors and others as well.
3. The peculiarities of the Americas and national deference under the American
Convention
¶81

A generic support of a doctrine of deference is too broad and does not properly
address several particularities that should be considered in the Inter-American system of
human rights protection. Two scholars have advanced arguments for an MOA doctrine
that takes account of more nuanced substantive issues.
¶82
In an article on freedom of expression under the Inter-American system of human
rights, Fuentes Torrijo has affirmed that an MOA doctrine should pay attention to the
differences between the American and the European Convention on human rights.243 One
of them is particularly important for our study. Article 29 of the American Convention
prescribes restrictions regarding the interpretation rights.244 The rules prohibit any
suppression of the “enjoyment or exercise” of the Convention’s rights as well as any
restriction of them “to a greater extent” than is provided by the Convention. There is no
similar rule to article 29 in the European Convention. 245 The Court has explicitly
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
Cançado Trindade, supra note 224, at 390.
243 Torrijo, supra note 226, at 243.
244 American Convention, supra note 3, at art. 29.
Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation.
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights
and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is
provided for herein;
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws
of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party;
c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived
from representative democracy as a form of government; or
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.”
245 The author also emphasizes the difference in the recognition of freedom of expression in both
international instruments. The American Convention establishes an explicit prohibition of prior restraint,
whereas the European Convention has no such provision. See Torrijo, supra note 226, at 236.

241

242

64

Vol. 11:1]

Pablo Contreras

acknowledged this difference.246 Therefore, the application of an MOA doctrine should
consider to what extent the mandate of article 29 can be compatible with the deference
sought by the doctrine.247 The Convention, as will be analyzed below, also incorporates
article 30 regulating the scope of rights restrictions, also impacting on the development of
an Inter-American theory of deference.248
¶83
Similarly, one could add another difference between the European and the
American Convention: the rules framing derogations of rights under each treaty.
Although Fuentes Torrijo does not raise this point, the systems of derogations—
”suspensions” under the American Convention—are quite different, especially when it
comes to the enumeration of non-derogable rights. The European Convention establishes
that only four rights are exempted from the provision regulating derogations, whereas the
American Convention has a considerable longer list.249 An MOA doctrine under the
American Convention should consider if the differences in the enumeration of nonderogable rights are important enough to determine the degree of deference afforded to
domestic authorities.
¶84
Fuentes Torrijo also considers Cançado’s position as too “paternalistic” and she
proposes to weigh three criteria in considering an MOA for domestic authorities
regarding free speech cases: (1) to analyze the type and the intensity of the challenged
interference to free speech; (2) to evaluate the type of speech at stake (whether it is
political speech or not); and (3) to consider the legitimate aim protected (e. g. morality or
national security).250 In general terms, she thinks that an MOA doctrine could serve
judicial self-restraint purposes without diminishing rights protection.251
¶85
Víctor Abramovich, a former member of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, has presented an additional perspective on the application of a doctrine of
deference. In his opinion, the tensions between the political autonomy of Latin American
States and the international protection of human rights should not forget the “patterns of
inequality and [social] exclusion” found in the region.252 For Abramovich, the InterAmerican system has correctly focused on the protection of certain groups, which have
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13
and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 5, ¶ 44 (Nov. 13, 1985).
247 Torrijo does not provide any criteria making Article 29 compatible with the MOA doctrine. Torrijo,
supra note 226, at 244.
248 See infra III, 4.1.
249 Article 15.2 of the European Convention establishes that is not allowed to derogate from the right to life
(“except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”), the prohibition of torture, the prohibition
of slavery or servitude and the prohibition of punishment without law. In sharp contrast, Article 27.2 of the
American Convention prohibits “any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical
Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from
Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion),
Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20
(Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees
essential for the protection of such rights.”
250 Id. at 243.
251 Id. at 241.
252 Abramovich, supra note 226, at 227. Abramovich has considered that the tension between State
sovereignty and international protection of human rights is merely a “mild” (leve) one. See Víctor
Abramovich, ¿Autonomía vs. Derechos Humanos? (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOnDbD6snEw.
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been historically or structurally discriminated States. Indigenous people, women,
undocumented migrants, small farmers or street children are among these target
groups.253 These are groups that have been systematically marginalized by State
authorities. International supervision for these groups tends to correct the deficit in the
domestic protection of their members’ rights.254
¶86
Abramovich thinks that the Inter-American Court should balance between respect
for the democratic sovereignty of States and the provision of international judicial review
sensitive to the patterns of exclusion suffered by these individuals255. According to this
commentator, a fair balance between the demands of political sovereignty and the
required international protection of human rights can achieved by complying with two
necessary conditions. The first condition requires the protection of rights at the national
level and exhaustion of domestic remedies for alleged violations of human rights. The
second condition seeks to restrain the power of the Inter-American Court and to reject the
role of international courts as a “fourth instance.”256 The “exhaustion of domestic
remedies” condition is a basic procedural requirement to trigger the Court’s
jurisdiction.257 The Inter-American Court can only act in a subsidiary fashion, after the
domestic means of protection have been used and they have not provided optimal results.
The so called the “fourth instance” doctrine or formula—the second condition—has been
defined by the Inter-American Commission in the following way: “[t]he basic premise of
this formula is that the Commission cannot review the judgments issued by the domestic
courts acting within their competence and with due judicial guarantees, unless it
considers that a possible violation of the Convention is involved.”258 The Inter-American
Court has refused to declare admissible a case where domestic courts have properly and
definitively settled the question, thus not requiring an international “confirmation” or
“approval.”259 These refusals might be understood as an application of the “fourth
instance” formula. By restraining the exercise of their own powers, the Court trusts and
defers to the judgment of domestic judicial authorities.
4. Conclusion
¶87

The debate among scholars shows the different issues that the application of the
MOA doctrine may raise in the context of the Inter-American human rights system.
253 Abramovich, supra note 226, at 217. See also Hennebel, supra note 234, at 60-65 (affirming that the
Inter-American Court has adopted a “victim oriented” reading of American Convention).
254 See infra III, 4.3.2.
255 The argument is partially similar to the one made by Benvenisti, who rejects the use of the MOA
doctrine in rights conflicts between majorities and minorities. See Benvenisti, supra note 25, at 847.
256 Abramovich, supra note 226, at 224-5.
257 See American Convention, supra note 3, art. 46(1)(a).
258 Marzioni v. Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Case No. 11.553, 119, OAS/ser.L/V/II.95, doc.7 (1997). See
also H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 52 (2d ed. 2004)
(stating that “the international forum will not second-guess the national forum’s findings of fact nor
whether the national court has applied the national law properly.”); Diego Rodríguez Pinzón, The “Victim”
Requirement, the Fourth Instance Formula and the Notion of “Person” in the Individual Complaint
Procedure of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 7 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (2001)
(defining the fourth instance formula in the following way: “decisions of impartial and independent
domestic courts are not subject to scrutiny under the American Convention.”).
259 Las Palmeras (merits), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 90, ¶ 33 (Dec. 6, 2001).
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Deference to domestic authorities under the American Convention should at least
consider the following factors: the textual restraints of the Convention (restrictions on
treaty interpretation and list of non-derogable rights), the patterns of inequality that
demand a more focused international review, and the existence/non-existence of
democratic governments. Review of the different issues on international deference should
lead to the conclusion that an automatic rejection of MOA doctrine is not appropriate. At
the same time, providing an MOA for domestic authorities should not be a carte blanche.
In the following section, the paper analyzes how the Inter-American Court has dealt in
the past with the issue of domestic discretion and international review.
D. National discretion in the restriction of rights under the American Convention
¶88

The Inter-American Court has adopted a group of conditions to justify a restriction
upon a right established in the American Convention. In its early case law, the Court
adopted three conditions, similar to the European Court: rights restrictions must have
been established by law, they must respond to a legitimate aim under the Convention, and
they must be necessary in a democratic society.260 Some years ago, the Court modified
the test for restrictions and added a new condition: restrictions must be “strictly
proportional” to the aim pursued, at least for reviewing free speech’s restrictions.261
¶89
The Inter-American Court has accepted margins of domestic deference only in a
few instances. The doctrinal standards are similar to the European Court’s case law but
their application has narrowed the latitude afforded to domestic authorities. The scarce
reference to the MOA doctrine has been addressed above. The paper now focuses on the
cases in which the Court has defined the varying degrees of national discretion, even
though the Court may not have employed the expression “margin of appreciation.” This
section is organized as follows. First, it analyzes each condition separately. After
reviewing the conditions of “prescribed by law” and the “legitimate aim” required under
the Convention, the paper focuses on the necessity and proportionality review. However,
since most of the cases decided by the Court have not demanded a necessity or
proportionality review, that part explores the different degrees of discretion afforded to
domestic authorities, depending on the right under review. The section concludes
exploring the potential new challenges for the Inter-American Court, in matters of
national discretion of domestic authorities and international supervision in the
enforcement of the American Convention obligations.

Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
151, ¶¶ 89-91 (Sept. 19, 2006). This decision established more precisely the three conditions. Previous
precedents also required the same conditions but they were not explicitly distinguished one from the other.
See Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra note 216, at ¶ 101.1; Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶¶ 95-96 (Aug. 31, 2004).
261 Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 58
(May 2, 2008). The fourth condition has been later reaffirmed in the Court’s jurisprudence. See Usón
Ramírez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 49 (Nov. 20, 2009).
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1. Restrictions must be prescribed by law
¶90

The Inter-American Court addressed the meaning of the word “law” in one of its
first advisory opinions.262 Article 30 of the American Convention establishes that “[t]he
restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise
of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with
laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which
such restrictions have been established.” The Court interpreted the “laws” as requiring
both “formal” and “material” considerations. “Law,” in its formal meaning, relates to the
procedure under which rules restricting rights are created. According to the Court, the
word “law” “can have no other meaning than that of formal law, that is, a legal norm
passed by the legislature and promulgated by the Executive Branch, pursuant to the
procedure set out in the domestic law of each State.”263 A law approved by the legislature
connects a democratic procedure with the protection of rights.264 The political
deliberation that emerges from the legislative proceedings is encompassed with
guarantees of transparency and political pluralism. In the words of the Court, “[s]uch a
procedure not only clothes these acts with the assent of the people through its
representatives, but also allows minority groups to express their disagreement, propose
different initiatives, participate in the shaping of the political will, or influence public
opinion so as to prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily.”265 Democracy, therefore,
constitutes the underlying assumption in the interpretation of the American Convention.
The Inter-American Court recognizes that the interpretation of article 30 has to be
connected with the intention of the States Parties to the Convention. Referring to the
Convention’s Preamble and the Organization of American States Charter, the Court said
that representative democracy constitutes a “determining factor” in the interpretation of
the restrictions of rights allowed under Convention.266
¶91
The “material” sense of law, on the other hand, refers to the quality of the law. The
quality of law is understood as a substantive requirement that any law restricting rights
must fulfill. The Court has paid special attention to the quality of law when States sought
to restrict rights by placing criminal punishments on certain activities.267 In accordance
with the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia, criminal laws must be
“formulated previously, in an express, accurate, and restrictive manner.”268 The Court has
added this “material” component for the drafting of laws and confining domestic
legislatures to provide clear notice to the group of citizens targeted by the rule. The
precision required for the restriction of rights has been extended beyond the realm of
criminal law. In Tristán Donoso v. Panama, the Court faced the issue of whether the
disclosure of a telephone conversation by a public official implied an interference with
The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6 (May 9, 1986).
263 Id. at ¶ 27.
264 Davidson, supra note 6, at 52; Aravena, supra note 240.
265 The Word “Laws”, supra note 262, at ¶22.
266 Id., at ¶ 34.
267 See, e. g., Castillo-Petruzzi et al v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am., Ct. H.R.
(ser. C), No. 52, ¶ 121 (May 30, 1999).
268 Kimmel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am., Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 117, ¶
63 (May 2, 2008).
262
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the right to privacy.269 In assessing the legality of the interference, the Court held that
“the general conditions and circumstances, which allow restricting the exercise of a
declared human right must be clearly established by statute. The rule, which allows for
such restriction must be both an enacted statute and a written rule of a general scope.”270
¶92
By placing both formal and material exigencies in the enactment of laws, the Court
has narrowed the margin of discretion that national authorities have in the restriction of
rights. The formal requirement connects democracy with the protection of human rights.
A democratic State has the necessary conditions of political pluralism and transparency
that facilitate public deliberation for adopting restrictions of rights. But that is not all. A
mere legislative enactment is not enough to protect rights. The quality of the law relates
to the level of precision that laws should have, as required under the American
Convention. Precision translates for citizens to clear notice and ability to understand the
extension and scope of their rights.
¶93
The difference between the European and the Inter-American systems lies in the
formal condition. The European Court places great weight on the quality of law—or the
“material” sense of law—leaving to States Parties certain flexibility to decide which
source of law is convenient for framing restrictions to a given right. On the other hand,
the Inter-American Court has adopted both formal and material notions of law, increasing
the safeguards against arbitrary impositions of rights restrictions.271 The formal notion of
law assumes democracy as a structural protection of human rights, though not the only
one.272 Discretion in selecting the source of law, accordingly, is more reduced in the
Inter-American compared to the European system.
2. Legitimate aims under the American Convention
¶94

The grounds for restricting a right are stated explicitly in each provision of the
Convention. Any restriction must be justified by the legitimate aim that the domestic
measure is trying to pursue. This condition is established, in general terms, in article

“Article 11. Right to Privacy
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home,
or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. . . .”
270 Tristán-Donoso v. Panama, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, ¶ 77 (Jan. 27, 2009).
271 But see LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA ÚBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 553 (2011) (stating that the wording “any limitation or
restriction must be both formally and materially provided for by law” used in the Kimmel decision, “was
doubtless intended to correct what seemed to be a clumsy declaration (eradicating the law in the formal
sense of the word in 1994 was obviously excessive).” The authors appear to suggest that it would be
preferable to favor only a “material” sense of law, focusing on the conditions necessary to achieve the
desired quality of law.).
272 The Court recognizes that structural protections are not enough: “[a]lthough it is true that this procedure
does not always prevent a law passed by the Legislature from being in violation of human rights—a
possibility that underlines the need for some system of subsequent control—there can be no doubt that it is
an important obstacle to the arbitrary exercise of power.” The Word “Laws”, supra note 262, at ¶ 22.
269
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30,273 and it is inferred by each provision that allows restrictions under certain legitimate
purposes.274
¶95
Unlike the European Court,275 the Inter-American Court has subjected to review
certain domestic measures not pursuing a legitimate aim. In Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru,276
the Court had to review—among other issues—the interference with the applicant’s right
to property.277 The applicant’s rights to shares controlling a Company were suspended
and he argued that that caused a deprivation of his right. The Court reasoned that, “[i]n
order for the deprivation of the property of a person to be compatible with . . . the
Convention, it should be based on reasons of public utility or social interest, subject to
the payment of just compensation, and be restricted to the cases and according to the
forms established by law.”278 The Court found that there was no evidence whatsoever to
justify, “based on reasons of public utility or social interest[,]” the restrictive measure on
the applicant’s right; “to the contrary, the proven facts in this case coincide to show the
State’s determination to deprive Mr. Ivcher of the control of Channel 2, by suspending
his rights as a shareholder of the Company that owned it.”279 The decision established
that Peru violated the applicant’s right to property.
¶96
The Inter-American Court usually focuses its review on the necessity or the
proportionality of each restrictive measure. Accordingly, most of the cases are decided
under the next step of analysis.
3. National discretion and the necessity and proportionality review
¶97

This section analyzes the different levels of discretion afforded to domestic
authorities by the Inter-American Court. In stark contrast to its European counterpart, the
Inter-American system has not developed a coherent theory of deference. Therefore, it is
not possible to classify cases in concentric circles similar to the European system.280 On
the contrary, the Inter-American Court has developed a “universalist” jurisprudence,
Article 30 establishes a general rule on the restrictions of the Convention’s rights and it expressly states
that “laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such
restrictions have been established.” (emphasis added).
274 See, e. g. Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶120 (July 2, 2004). Rights with limitation clauses have
different legitimate aims. Some of them are repeated in the different rights, for example, “national security”
(arts. 13, 15, 16, 22), “public safety” (arts. 12, 15, 16, 22), “protection of health” (arts. 12, 13, 15, 16, 22),
“protection of morals” (arts. 12, 13, 15, 16, 22), and “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (arts.
12, 13, 15, 16, 22, 32).
275 As noted above, there is only one rare exception where the European Court found that there was no
legitimate aim justifying the restriction of a right under the European Convention. See supra II, 3.2.
276 Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74
(Feb. 6, 2001).
277 “Article 21. Right to Property
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. . . .”.
278 Id., at ¶ 128.
279 Id., at ¶ 129. The Court also found that no compensation was paid for the deprivation of the applicant’s
right to property. Id. at ¶ 130.
280 Supra II, 3.3.1-3.
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declaring several jus cogens rules of Public International Law.281 Most of the case law
recognizing peremptory or jus cogens rules has dealt with the major atrocities committed
in Latin American countries. Forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and acts of
torture have motivated the Inter-American Court to adopt a strong commitment with the
protection and promotion of fundamental human rights throughout the continent. These
cases show that, concerning jus cogens rules, there is no domestic discretion available,
same as the European Court’s case law. Moreover, the Court imposes specific positive
duties to States Parties, further shrinking the spectrum of action from which national
authorities can select alternatives for protecting rights.
¶98
At the same time, the Court has declared that the prohibition of non-discrimination
constitutes a peremptory rule of Public International Law. A broad rule upholding
equality helps the Court to protect vulnerable or marginal groups and to assert affirmative
or positive duties to the States, concerning the protection and promotion of these
individual’s rights. Regarding these groups –and in connection with the principle of nondiscrimination–State’s authorities have a number of obligations to act under the
American Convention. Once again, the Court not only does not specify an MOA doctrine
in these cases: it imposes positive mandates to national authorities on how to act in order
to protect and promote the rights of these vulnerable groups.
¶99
The Inter-American Court has also addressed violations of freedom of expression.
The Court has vigorously protected political speech, much like the European Court.
Unlike the other categories of cases, the Court has not acted boldly by declaring jus
cogens rules regarding free speech. Nonetheless, in accordance with the very broad
language of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court has relied on the social
dimension of freedom of expression to establish a right to receive public information held
in the hands of the State.
¶100
Finally, a small last set of cases show that the Inter-American Court on occasions
has permitted some discretion for national authorities under very limited circumstances.
This last part of the paper identifies the levels of discretion afforded to domestic
authorities, even though the Court may not intend to use the MOA doctrine as such.
i) Forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and acts of torture
¶101

The first contentious case decided by the Inter-American Court addressed the issue
of forced disappearances perpetrated by State agents. In the landmark Velásquez
Rodriguez case, the Court held that forced disappearances violated the right to life, the
prohibition of torture, and the right to personal liberty of the victims (articles 4, 5 and 7
of the American Convention).282 While there was not conclusive evidence that Honduran
public officials killed the victims, the Court reasoned that it was enough to prove that
“there was an official practice of disappearances in Honduras, carried out by the
Government or at least tolerated by it,” and that the specific disappearances could be
linked to such practice.283 The Velásquez Rodríguez decision is also critically relevant for
recognizing positive obligations upon States parties to the American Convention. The
Hennebel, supra note 235.
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 193, ¶¶155-7. See also Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras,
Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, ¶¶163-5 (Jan. 20, 1989).
283 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 192, at ¶126.
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Court held that each State has the “legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
the violations committed within its jurisdiction.”284 Such duty is broad in essence and it
goes from legal and administrative measures to any political or cultural ones in order to
ensure and protect human rights.285
¶102
Since the Velásquez Rodríguez decision, the Court has delivered a considerable
number of decisions involving forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.286 But the
relevance of the decision extends beyond cases about disappearances or extrajudicial
killings, and cannot be underestimated in the field of international human rights law. The
European Court has incorporated the holding of the decision into its own case law.287 The
major impact, though, will come in the evolution of the Inter-American Court’s
jurisprudence.
¶103
An important breakthrough came with the Goiburú case.288 The case concerned the
infamous “Operation Condor” (Operación Cóndor or Plan Cóndor), a military and
intelligence campaign conducted by the military dictatorships of the southern cone of
South America –Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay—aimed to
detain and to kill leftist dissidents called “subversive elements.”289 The military operation
was a carefully crafted strategy to detain, to torture—with the purpose of gathering
intelligence—and to kill political dissidents that were labeled as communists.290 The
Inter-American Court took the Velásquez Rodríguez doctrine to the next level. The Court
expressly declared that the “prohibition of the forced disappearance of persons and the
corresponding obligation to investigate and punish those responsible has attained the
status of jus cogens.”291 Later decisions have confirmed this declaration.292
¶104
The Court has recognized identical duties in the cases involving extrajudicial
killings and acts of torture. On a similar note, it has also declared that certain obligations
under the American Convention have the status of jus cogens rules. Regarding
Id., at ¶ 174.
Id., at ¶ 175.
286 The great bulk of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence deal with these issues. For the most recent
decision, see Gonzalez-Medina and Relatives v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 240 (Feb. 27, 2012) (available only in
Spanish).
287 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 132 (May 10, 2001) (“The Court recalls that
there is no proof that any of the missing persons have been unlawfully killed. However, in its opinion, and
of relevance to the instant case, the above-mentioned procedural obligation also arises upon proof of an
arguable claim that an individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents of the State, subsequently
disappeared in a context which may be considered life-threatening.”).
288 Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
153 (Sept. 22, 2006).
289 Id., at ¶ 61(5). On the Operation Condor, see GOBIERNO DE CHILE INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL
DE VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN, RETTIG REPORT (1991), http://www.ddhh.gov.cl/ddhh_rettig.html;
GOBIERNO DE CHILE, INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE PRISIÓN POLÍTICA Y TORTURA (2004),
http://www.comisionvalech.gov.cl/InformeValech.html.
290 Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, supra note 288, at ¶ 61(12).
291 Id. at ¶ 84. See also id. at ¶¶ 93, 128, 131.
292 Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
162, ¶ 157 (Nov. 29, 2006); Tiu-Tojín v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶ 91 (Nov. 26, 2008) (adding that “the forced disappearance of persons cannot be
considered a political crime or related to political crimes under any circumstance . . .”).
284
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extrajudicial killings, the Court has adopted the criteria expressed by the Colombian
Constitutional Court that certain rules of International Humanitarian Law should be
deemed as jus cogens. In the Case of the Mapiripán Massacre, the Court has considered
that such corpus of law can be used to interpret the right to life and the general duties
under article 1 of the Convention.293 In a series of cases, the Court has said that:
[i]n compliance with the obligations imposed by [a]rticle 4 of the
American Convention, in relation to [a]rticle 1(1) thereof, this not only
assumes that no one shall be deprived of his life arbitrarily (negative
obligation), but also, in light of the State’s obligation to guarantee the full
and free exercise of human rights, it requires States to adopt all the
appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life (positive
obligation). This active protection of the right to life by the State involves
not only its legislators, but all State institutions, and those responsible for
safeguarding security, whether they are members of its police forces or its
armed forces. Consequently, States must adopt the necessary measures,
not only at the legislative, administrative and judicial level, by issuing
penal norms and establishing a system of justice to prevent, eliminate and
punish the deprivation of life as a result of criminal acts, but also to
prevent and protect individuals from the criminal acts of other individuals
and to investigate these situations effectively.294
¶105

The Court has also declared the “absolute” prohibition of torture a jus cogens
rule. Both negative and positive obligations arise from this prohibition. Positive duties,
just like in forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings cases, impose the obligation
upon States to investigate and punish those responsible for the violations.296
¶106
The declaration of the jus cogens rules of International Law, adopted by the Court,
impacts the national discretion of domestic authorities. First, by imposing new duties and,
secondly, opening new possibilities for domestic discretion in the enforcement of these
obligations. On the first part, it should be noted that not only are the prohibitions of
forced disappearance of persons, of extrajudicial killings, or of acts of torture now jus
cogens rules, the Court has extended the same status to the positive duties to investigate
and punish these acts. Both obligations are considered to be peremptory norms of Public
International Law. The positive duty to investigate and punish is conceptually an
independent obligation under the American Convention.297
¶107
On the second part, the definition of these positive duties, first established in the
Velásquez Rodríguez decision, has been refined over time. In the Goiburú decision, the
Court held that the American Convention requires a “prompt, serious, impartial and
295

Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 196, at ¶ 155.
Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 120 (Jan. 31, 2006) (footnotes omitted). See also Baldeón-García v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, ¶ 84 (Apr. 6, 2006).
295 Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
103, ¶ 92 (Nov. 27, 2003); Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶ 112 (July 8, 2004).
296 See, e. g., id. at ¶ 159.
297 Burgorgue-Larsen & Úbeda de Torres, supra note 271, at 304-5.
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effective investigation ex officio” to address alleged forced disappearances of persons.298
These conditions limit the national discretion of domestic authorities, especially in
matters like prosecutorial discretion. Although the Court imposes “an obligation of means
and not of results,” investigations cannot be “a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective.”299 These conditions fall within the obligations with which police and
prosecutorial bodies in each State must comply. The whole jurisprudence of the Court
denies any MOA doctrine in these cases, just like the European Court’s case law on
fundamental rights.300 Despite this similarity, there is an important qualifier. The InterAmerican system has been developing a series of conditions required to satisfy the
obligations of protecting and promoting the Convention’s rights. Therefore, States Parties
have seen how the imposition of positive duties and their refinement by the Court have
narrowed any margin of discretion that domestic authorities may have in addressing these
issues. The Court’s interpretation on the Convention’s positive duties also applies in the
next group of cases.
ii) Vulnerable groups
¶108

The second set of cases has a common characteristic: these cases concern different
groups of individuals that have suffered “structural or historical” patterns of
discrimination within society.301 The Court has adopted a “victim oriented” approach,
which can be explained as follows: its jurisprudence “systematically deduces a special
need for protection tailored according to the vulnerabilities of certain groups which are
particularly targeted.”302 The principle of equality and the rule of non-discrimination are
directly or indirectly at stake in each of these cases.
¶109
It is important to note that the Inter-American Court has declared “that the principle
of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination is jus
cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests
on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws.”303 The Court considers
that the principle of equality and the prohibition of non-discrimination impose affirmative
duties upon States parties to the American Convention. Expressed in broad terms, the
Court held that States “are obliged to take affirmative action to reverse or change
discriminatory situations that exist in their societies to the detriment of a specific group of
persons. This implies the special obligation to protect that the State must exercise with
regard to acts and practices of third parties who, with its tolerance or acquiescence,
create, maintain or promote discriminatory situations.”304 The affirmative mandate
impacts decisions concerning violence against women, rights of street children, rights of
indigenous peoples and rights of undocumented migrant workers. Two examples are

Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, supra note 288, at ¶88.
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 289 (Nov. 16, 2009).
300 Supra II, 3.3.1.
301 The expression is taken from Abramovich, supra note 226, at 217.
302 Hennebel, supra note 234, at 64.
303 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 2003).
304 Id. at ¶ 104.
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helpful to understand the extension of the positive obligations imposed upon States
authorities: the cases of women and indigenous peoples.305
¶110
In the case of women, the Court has delineated the conditions under which the
affirmative duty must be undertaken by national authorities. The decision upholding these
duties is known as the Cotton Field case, involving the structural and systematic rights
violations perpetrated in Ciudad Juárez, México against women.306 The report of the
Inter-American Commission describes a “grave situation of violence faced by the women
and girls of Ciudad Juárez, including murder and disappearance, as well as sexual and
domestic violence.”307 The Court found that, although there “are no reliable assumptions
about the number of murders and disappearances of women in Ciudad Juárez, . . .
whatever the number, it is alarming.”308 Since 1993, estimations on the number of women
murdered or disappeared range from, in some reports, 260 to 370 women, to more than
4,000 women missing, in others.309 In the Cotton Camp decision, the Court specified the
obligations to respect and to guarantee the rights of women. The obligation to respect the
right to life, to physical integrity and to personal liberty entails a negative duty: State
agents should refrain from violating these rights. The Court did not find that Mexico
violated this obligation.310 A different outcome came regarding the obligation to
guarantee rights. Here, it found positive duties to prevent human rights violations and to
investigate them effectively once they have occurred.311 The obligation of prevention
“encompasses all those measures of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature
that ensure the safeguard of human rights, and that any possible violation of these rights
is considered and treated as an unlawful act, which, as such, may result in the punishment
of the person who commits it, as well as the obligation to compensate the victims for the
harmful consequence.”312 The Court explicitly demanded the adoption of “positive
measures” to address the needs of women’s protection.313 The decision also reaffirmed
the duty to investigate and punish gross violations under articles 4, 5, and 7 of the
American Convention.314
¶111
The second example involves the protection afforded by the Court to indigenous
peoples, especially in cases involving the right to property and political rights. The Court
has recognized ancestral and communal rights to property under article 21 of the

305 See Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63 (Nov. 19, 1999); Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants,
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003).
306 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
307 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico: The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L/V//II.117, Doc. 44, March
2003, ¶1.
308 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 121 (Nov. 16, 2009).
309 Burgorgue-Larsen & Úbeda de Torres, supra note 271, at 433-34 (evaluating different estimations).
310 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 235, 242 (Nov. 16, 2009).
311 Id. at ¶¶ 248, 281-82.
312 Id. at ¶ 252.
313 Id. at ¶ 243.
314 Id.
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Convention.315 In the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community case, the Court identified a
collective dimension to the right to property. The Court said that “indigenous
communities might have a collective understanding of the concepts of property and
possession” and though that notion “does not necessarily conform to the classic concept
of property,” it nonetheless “deserves equal protection under article 21 of the American
Convention.”316 Communal property has been protected even against those States Parties
to the Convention that have not recognized the right to communal property in their
domestic laws.317 The Court based its decision on the restrictions regarding interpretation
of the Convention’s rights—established on article 29(b)—and held that Suriname had “an
obligation to adopt special measures to recognize, respect, protect and guarantee the
communal property right of the members of the Saramaka community to said
territory.”318 The use of article 29(b) shows how the textual differences between the
American and the European Conventions affect the scope of obligations and the degree of
national authorities’ discretion under each international instrument.
¶112
In these cases, the Court has accepted that property rights can be subject to
limitations. Nonetheless, the Court assumes the centrality of communal property at the
core of the existence of indigenous communities, affecting the proportionality review.
Accordingly, the Court has reasoned that, “the restriction of the right of private
individuals to private property might be necessary to attain the collective objective of
preserving cultural identities in a democratic and pluralist society.”319
¶113
Political rights and political participation of indigenous peoples have been
reviewed along with the non-discrimination principle. In a landmark statement, the Court
considered that:
[t]he State should adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the members
of the indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua can participate, in equal conditions, in decision-making on
matters and policies that affect or could affect their rights and the
development of these communities, so that they can incorporate State
institutions and bodies and participate directly and proportionately to their
population in the conduct of public affairs, and also do this from within
their own institutions and according to their values, practices, customs and

American Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. See generally, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31,
2001); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28).
316 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006).
317 Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28).
318 Id. at ¶96.
319 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 148 (Jun. 17, 2005).
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forms of organization, provided these are compatible with the human
rights embodied in the Convention.320
¶114

The Court has upheld in these cases the jus cogens nature of the principle of
equality and it has expanded the consequences of that principle by requiring State parties
to adopt affirmative duties in favor of indigenous peoples. States, therefore, are obliged to
promote political participation.
¶115
The way in which the Court has confronted the violation of vulnerable groups’
rights shows a decisive jurisprudence upholding the positive duties established under the
American Convention. In each decision, the Inter-American Court not only reaffirms the
critical importance of non-discrimination under the Convention but also refines the duty
to protect these vulnerable groups. The inevitable consequence of such jurisprudence is to
impose more constraints on national discretion. The Court does not provide clear criteria
of international deference in the implementation of the positive duties established under
the Convention. On the contrary, each decision adds nuanced specifications on the
several dimensions of these affirmative duties, ranging from criminal prosecutions to the
protection of communal property or the participation in the political process.
iii) Freedom of expression
¶116

The third set of cases groups the Court’s interpretations of the scope of freedom of
expression under the Convention. The text of the American Convention imposes more
constraints on the restriction of free speech than other human rights instruments.321 One
of the most important differences is found in the prohibition of “prior censorship” or prior
restraint.322 The explicit prohibition eliminates any national discretion on this matter. The
Last Temptation of the Christ decision shows how categorically the Court applies the
prohibition of prior censorship.323 In this case, Chile’s administrative agencies and courts
banned the showing of Martin Scorsese’s film The Last Temptation of the Christ. The
Court said that the prohibition of prior restraint applies to the decisions of every branch
of the government and that the censorship of the film constituted a violation of the right
to freedom of expression.324 The result stands in sharp contrast to the European Court
decisions on the blasphemy cases reviewed above.325 Without any textual requirement on
prior restraint in the European Convention, the Court held that domestic authorities did
not go beyond their MOA under their international obligations.
¶117
Freedom of expression under the American Convention has an individual and a
social dimension. The individual dimension requires that “no one [can] be arbitrarily
limited or impeded in expressing his own thoughts” whereas the social one “implies a
collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts

Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 225 (Jun. 23, 2005).
321 See Compulsory Membership, supra note 246, at ¶ 45.
322 American Convention, supra note 3, at art. 13(2).
323 Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, supra note 215.
324 Id. at ¶¶ 72-73.
325 Supra II, 3.3.3.1.
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expressed by others.”326 The social dimension grants great weight in the protection of the
media and the formation of public opinion. Under this dimension, the Court has declared
that States Parties to the American Convention have a positive duty to provide access to
public information.327 The Court ruled that article 13 “protects the right of the individual
to receive such information and the positive obligation of the State to provide it, so that
the individual may have access to such information or receive an answer that includes a
justification when, for any reason permitted by the Convention, the State is allowed to
restrict access to the information in a specific case.”328 Commentators have underlined
that the Court took “advantage of the broad scope of article 13(1)”329 which expressly
states the freedom to receive information. Once again, the decision of the Inter-American
Court imposes positive duties upon domestic authorities.
¶118
The democratic rationale underlying each of the Inter-American Court’s decisions
upholding freedom of expression has impacts on its robust protection of political speech.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the adoption of restrictions to free speech in this area.
Decisions are quite similar to the European standard in cases like Lingens or Castells,330
which have been cited by the Inter-American Court to interpret the scope of article 13.
One of the major obstacles to the protection of political speech in the Americas has been
found in the existence of “desacato” (contempt) laws and criminal defamation. These
laws establish a “criminal punishment of insults to public officials in the performance of
their functions.”331 The “chilling effect” of these offenses constitutes a particular threat to
free speech, particularly when public officials cannot be criticized without the threat of a
potential criminal punishment. The Court has held that “statements concerning public
officials and other individuals who perform public services are afforded, as set forth in
article 13(2) of the Convention, greater protection, thus allowing some latitude for broad
debate, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system.”332 The Court
acknowledges that a “different threshold” is applicable to the protection of the
information uttered in light of the “characteristics of public interest inherent in the
activities or acts of a specific individual” like politicians, public servants or those who
run to be elected to public office.333 Therefore, political speech is protected with the same
intensity before the Inter-American and the European courts.
326 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13
and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 5, ¶ 30 (Nov. 13, 1985); Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile
supra note 215, at ¶ 64.
327 Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
151 (Sept. 19, 2006).
328 Id. at ¶ 77.
329 Burgorgue-Larsen & Úbeda de Torres, supra note 271, at 544.
330 See supra II, 3.3.1.2.
331 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., “Desacato” Laws and Criminal Defamation,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/desacato/Desacato%202004.pdf.
332 Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
135, ¶82 (Nov. 22, 2005) (emphasis added).
333 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., “Desacato”, supra note 331, at 139. In the Court’s case law, see Ricardo
Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 98
(Aug. 31, 2004); Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 135, ¶ 82 (Nov. 22, 2005); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107 (July 2, 2004).
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There are basically two differences between the European and the Inter-American
systems. The first one flows from the explicit prohibition of prior restraint in the
American Convention. The second difference concerns the interpretation of the InterAmerican Court reading freedom of expression as a right to receive public information
and, therefore, including positive duties under article 13 of the American Convention.
iv) New challenges

¶120

In this last part, this paper focuses on cases where the Court has defined minimum
degrees of discretion for domestic authorities and some potential new challenges that the
Court may have to face in the future. These decisions do not refer explicitly or literally to
the MOA doctrine. However, they may fit under a broader understanding of international
deference and national discretion in the Inter-American Court’s standard of review.
¶121
As this paper has shown, the Inter-American Court exercises an intensive
international scrutiny on the enforcement of the Convention’s obligations. Nonetheless,
the Court has acknowledge certain limits to international supervision, at least as dicta in
some decisions. In matters of free speech, the Court has said that, “there should be a
reduced margin for any restriction on political debates or on debates on matters of public
interest.”334 The Court has not come to the point of banning criminal offenses in speech
related cases. In Kimel, the Court held that the domestic decision of criminalizing certain
types of speech “should be carefully analyzed” by States parties, “pondering the extreme
seriousness of the conduct of the individual who expressed the opinion, his actual malice,
the characteristics of the unfair damage caused, and other information which shows the
absolute necessity to resort to criminal proceedings.”335 The decision does not consider
criminal offenses as violations per se of article 13(2), allowing them under certain
conditions. The opinion leaves limited room for national discretion to decide between
competing interests such as free speech in a democratic society and the protection of the
privacy and the reputation of others, both rights protected under the Convention.
¶122
An exceptional—and almost marginal—example of a Court’s exercise of selfrestraint is found in Castañeda-Gutman v. Mexico.336 One of the claims made before the
Court involved the right to participate in the government.337 The government denied the
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 127 (July 2, 2004).
335 Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 78
(May 2, 2008). The Court added that, in the case of adopting a criminal offense, “[a]t all stages the burden
of proof must fall on the party who brings the criminal proceedings.” Id.
336 Castañeda-Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184 (Aug. 6, 2008).
337American Convention, supra note 3, at art. 23:
Article 23. Right to Participate in Government
1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:
a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and
c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country.
2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding
paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental
capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.
334
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registration of the independent candidate, Castañeda-Gutman, to run for the office of
President of the United Mexican States. The electoral rules in Mexico required that only
political parties are able to nominate presidential candidates. The Court had to decide
whether the restriction placed upon independent candidates violated the right to
participate in the government under article 23 of the American Convention. The
reasoning of the Court begins by acknowledging that, “in general, international law does
not impose a specific electoral system or a specific means of exercising the rights to vote
and to be elected.”338 In addressing the issue of the right’s restriction, the Court accepted
that “the establishment and application of requirements to exercise political rights is not,
per se, an undue restriction of political rights.”339 The decision goes on to apply the three
standards in the restriction of rights: if the measure was prescribed by law, if it had a
legitimate aim, and if it was necessary in a democratic society and proportional to the aim
pursued. Regarding the first prong of the test, the Court found that a law, in its formal and
substantive dimension, regulated the elections and the registration of candidacies.340 On
the second standard, the Court held that the restriction “was designed to organize the
electoral process and the access of citizens to the exercise of public office under equal
conditions and effectively.”341 That organization was deemed “essential” to the exercise
of the right to vote. The decision then examined the necessity and the proportionality of
the restrictive measure. At this level of analysis, the Court recognizes that the American
Convention “does not establish the obligation to implement a specific electoral system”
or a “specific mandate on the mechanism that the States must establish to regulate the
exercise of the right to be elected in general elections.”342 In other words, the Convention
must leave a margin of discretion for domestic authorities in choosing the rules of any
electoral system. Although the decision does not use the words margin of appreciation,
its effects are practically equivalent in terms of international deference to States parties.
The Court then declares that, “[i]n the region, there is a certain balance between the
States that have established the system of registration exclusively by parties and those
that also allow independent candidacies.”343 Again, this phrase looks very similar to the
idea of the absence of a regional consensus used in the European Court’s MOA analysis.
The Court concludes that the measure was proportional under the Convention.344 As a
final remark, it affirmed the following:
[t]he Court considers that both systems, one built on the exclusive basis of
political parties, and the other that also allows independent candidacies
can be compatible with the Convention and, therefore, the decision on
which system to choose is subject to the political decision made by the
State, in accordance with its constitutional norms. The Court is aware that
there is a profound crisis as regards the political parties, the legislatures
and those who conduct public affairs in the region, which calls for a
338 Castañeda-Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 162 (Aug. 6, 2008).
339 Id. at ¶ 174.
340 Id. at ¶ 179.
341 Id. at ¶ 183.
342 Id. at ¶ 197.
343 Id. at ¶ 198.
344 Id. at ¶ 203.
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thorough and thoughtful debate on political participation and
representation, transparency, and the rapprochement of the institutions to
the people, in brief, on strengthening and improving democracy. Civil
society and the State have the fundamental responsibility, which cannot be
waived, to carry out this discussion and make proposals to reverse the
situation. In this regard, the States must assess the measures that will
strengthen political rights and democracy according to their particular
historical and political evolution, and independent candidacies may be one
among many of these mechanisms.345
¶123

The Castañeda-Gutman decision is unique in the Inter-American system, at least
concerning the national discretion of domestic authorities. It is a decision that, without
using an MOA doctrine, recognizes international deference in the regulation of electoral
systems. The examples noted here show that degrees of national discretion can be
identified without resorting to the European doctrine. However, such doctrinal
construction requires some principled basis and it should not depend merely on the
product of the proportionality review. In other words, the Court should pay attention to
different factors such as regional consensus to articulate different spheres of international
deference. The Castañeda-Gutman decision is a good starting point for that line of
jurisprudence. As the Inter-American Court faces more cases of a less egregious
character than forced disappearances or torture, its jurisprudence may come to align more
closely with that of the European Court, allowing more national discretion whether or not
the concept of the MOA is used. New cases and new challenges may force the InterAmerican Court to develop a theory of international deference to address them.

IV. CONCLUSION
¶124

National discretion and international supervision are two concepts that will be in
permanent tension in the work of human rights regional courts. The case law of the
European and the Inter-American courts shows how both international bodies have dealt
with issues showing this tension. Similarities and differences in the case law of both
courts can be underlined here.
¶125
This paper has reviewed the body of case law from the European and the InterAmerican Court, regarding international deference in the restriction of rights. Traditional
scholarship on this matter has focused mainly on the MOA doctrine. The analysis
presented here has gone beyond that approach by distinguishing three different levels in
each regional system. The first level concerned the requirement of legality in rights
restrictions. The European Court has demanded accessibility and foreseeability of laws.
The Inter-American Court has followed a similar path, but it has considered also a
“formal” requirement of democratic nature: the legislative branch of the government
must approve the laws that impose restrictions. The second level examined the legitimate
aim invoked by States in order to justify a right’s restriction. In both courts, this
requirement operates as highly deferential to State parties. The third level is different.
Proportionality and necessity of domestic restrictive measures have been reviewed here.
345

Id. at ¶ 204 (emphasis added).
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In Europe, following the contributions of Letsas and García Roca, we have analyzed
deference in different cases, grouping them in concentric circles from less deference (or
nothing at all) to a wider MOA. Different shades of discretion have been identified at this
level. The Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence, on the other hand, shows a different
picture. The Court has strictly scrutinized most cases. Only exceptionally we can find
traces of the MOA doctrine and new standards for discretion.
¶126
The standards for discretion at the third level show international convergence and
divergence. Both courts have strongly scrutinized violations of fundamental rights and
political speech cases. In contrast, the Inter-American Court exercises a more intensive
international review of State actions than its European counterpart. While the European
Court has developed a complex theory of deference under the MOA doctrine, the InterAmerican Court has imposed positive duties under the American Convention, affecting
the range of discretion of domestic authorities.
¶127
The MOA doctrine will continue to play a role in the European Court’s new human
rights challenges. The lack of such a doctrine in the Inter-American system makes it
impossible to know how the Inter-American Court will decide contentious issues, which
may require deferring to domestic authorities. The systematization and comparison of
both Court’s case law will guide the solution to these new challenges.
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